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THE PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW OF 
HAZING CONSENT 
GREGORY S. PARKS* AND TIFFANY F. SOUTHERLAND** 
For years, the law has grappled with the extent to which an individual 
can consent to harmful physical contact.  This has never been more evi-
dent than in the area of hazing.  Courts have fallen on both sides of this 
divide, often enough speculating about the mental state of the alleged haz-
ing victim.  The question is often whether the individual had the psycho-
logical wherewithal to resist situational or contextual demands placed on 
him or her.  In this Article, the authors provide clarity to how the law has 
thought about this issue and how it should think about it in light of a 
range of psychological theories and empirical research. 
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2 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 19, 2011, Robert Champion, a twenty-six-year-old 
clarinet player and drum major in Florida A&M University’s (FAMU) 
Marching 100 band, collapsed on a charter bus parked outside an Or-
lando hotel, following a band performance at a football game between 
FAMU and Bethune-Cookman.1  The Georgia native had become anx-
ious, complaining of shortness of breath and failed eyesight, and had 
apparently been vomiting before ultimately losing consciousness.2  
Champion was nonresponsive when authorities arrived at approximately 
9:45 p.m. and was later pronounced dead at a nearby hospital.3  An ini-
tial emergency caller told the dispatcher that Champion had been vomit-
ing and that “[h]is eyes [were] open but [he was] not responding.”4  A 
second caller told the dispatcher that Champion was “cold.”5 
By Tuesday, November 22, rumors had already circulated on the 
FAMU campus and social media that hazing had played a part in 
Champion’s death.6  Law enforcement officials also believed some form 
of hazing to have occurred before the 911 emergency call was placed.7  
Ultimately, suspicions that hazing played a role in Champion’s death 
were confirmed when Champion’s death was ruled a homicide by the 
State Medical Examiner’s Office in Orlando.8  The medical examiner’s 
office found that Champion’s death resulted from blunt-force trauma 
suffered during a hazing incident involving some members of FAMU’s 
Marching 100.9  Champion endured such severe blows during the inci-
 
1. Freida Frisaro, Attorney Says Suit Planned in FAMU Band Death, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 25, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9R7V2NO0; Brent Kallestad, Fired 
FAMU Band Director: Hazing Warnings Ignored, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2011, availa-
ble at NewsBank, Rec. No. 0ef37ebd103d533dbf5020cbc498970b [hereinafter Kallestad, Haz-
ing Warnings Ignored]. 
2. Paul Flemming, Autopsy: FAMU Drum Major Died Within One Hour of Hazing, 
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 22, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912380698; Autop-
sy: Fla. A&M Drum Major’s Death a Homicide, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 2011, 
available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912012529 [hereinafter Autopsy]. 
3. Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1. 
4. Mike Schneider & Gary Fineout, Vomit in FAMU Student’s Mouth Before He Dies, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. c502d9622d494a9935508b
79be7f82eb. 
5. Id. 
6. Jordan Culver, Hazing Rumors Surround Death of Fla. Student, GANNETT NEWS 
SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 905839615. 
7. Frisaro, supra note 1. 
8. Flemming, supra note 2; Autopsy, supra note 2. 
9. Autopsy, supra note 2. 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 3 
dent that he bled out into his soft tissue, particularly in his back, chest, 
shoulders, and arms.10  The autopsy further revealed that Champion had 
been vomiting profusely and died within an hour of the time he suffered 
the injuries.11  Toxicology tests revealed no traces of drugs or alcohol in 
Champion’s system.12 
Immediately following Champion’s death, FAMU President James 
Ammons suspended all of the Marching 100’s appearances and perfor-
mances, and the band’s immediate future became unclear.13  Four days 
after Champion’s death, Ammons fired band director Julian White who 
was later reinstated and placed on administrative leave after the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement requested that the university put a 
hold on any disciplinary actions during its investigation into Champion’s 
beating death.14  White argued that he had repeatedly tried to take 
measures against hazing within the FAMU Marching 100 and had not 
been backed by the university’s administration.15  Ultimately, White re-
tired when it was discovered that many of the Marching 100’s members 
(three of whom were allegedly involved in Champion’s hazing death) 
were not students at FAMU and were not enrolled in any band classes.16  
Several weeks later, Ammons suspended all of the Marching 100’s ap-
pearances and performances and addressed some 2,000 FAMU students, 
 
10. Flemming, supra note 2; Mike Schneider, 13 Charged in Hazing Death of Fla. Band 
Member, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 2, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. f6a3310a4251b0 
62a27873387f42151f. 
11. Flemming, supra note 2. 
12. Id. 
13. Culver, supra note 6; Schneider, supra note 10.  Initially following Champion’s death, 
Ammons vowed to convene an independent task force to investigate successful anti-hazing 
policies at other colleges and universities and make recommendations as to how to eliminate 
hazing on the FAMU campus.  See FAMU President Postpones Work of Hazing Task Force, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9RC6CQO0.  In De-
cember, however, Ammons decided to postpone the task force so that “the school could fully 
cooperate with investigations by the Florida Board of Governors, Orange County Sheriff’s 
Office and Florida Department of Law Enforcement.”  Id.  In February of 2012, the FAMU 
Board of Trustees appointed seven experts to the independent task force.  Jennifer Portman, 
Florida A&M Selects Anti-Hazing Committee, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 9, 2012, avail-
able at ProQuest, Doc. No. 920882621. 
14. Bill Cotterell, Gov. Scott Repeats Call for Florida A&M President to Step Aside, 
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 18, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912012484. 
15. Frisaro, supra note 1; Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1. 
16. Gary Fineout, Florida A&M President Resigns in Wake of Scandal, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, July 12, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 0d5debc3da823324c335e16f5261279b; 
Jennifer Portman, 3 Charged in Hazing Death Were Not Enrolled at Florida A&M, GANNETT 
NEWS SERVICE, May 8, 2012, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 1011642906. 
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4 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
reaffirming FAMU’s commitment to ending the “conspiracy of silence” 
that surrounds hazing practices at the school.17  Petitions pledging to end 
hazing were circulated throughout the audience.18 
Hazing within the FAMU Marching 100 is said to have begun as ear-
ly as the 1950s and has generally been associated with entry into sub-
groups within the band rather than entry into the band itself.19  In 1998, 
clarinet player Ivery Luckey was hospitalized after being hit approxi-
mately 300 times with a wooden paddle.20  Luckey’s beating occurred 
during initiation into a band clique known as “The Clones.”21  Twenty or 
so “band members were suspended, and Luckey sued the state Board of 
Regents,” ultimately settling out of court.22  Three years later, Marcus 
Parker was hospitalized after suffering kidney damage resultant from 
being beaten with a wooden paddle.23 
On October 31, 2011, and November 1, 2011, just weeks before the 
hazing incident that resulted in Champion’s death, Bria Shante Hunter 
was beaten so severely during her initiation into the “Red Dawg Order,” 
a band clique for Georgia natives, that she could barely walk.24  Accord-
ing to authorities, Hunter’s pain became so unbearable that she went to 
the hospital where she was told she had a broken thighbone and blood 
clots in her legs.25  Hunter was a freshman clarinet player and, like 
Champion, a leader in the FAMU band and graduate from Southwest 
DeKalb High School in Georgia.26  She was beaten in two separate inci-
dents.27  The first, she said, occurred when leaders of the Red Dawg Or-
der suspected that she was trying to get out of a group meeting.28  The 
second incident occurred when she was unable to accurately answer 
 
17. Culver, supra note 6; Brent Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders Call for an End to 
Hazing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9REO17O0 
[hereinafter Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders]. 
18. Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders, supra note 17. 
19. Culver, supra note 6; Schneider, supra note 10. 
20. Greg Bluestein & Gary Fineout, Attorney: FAMU Student Hazed Could Barely 
Walk, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9RJTGMO0; 
Frisaro, supra note 1; Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1. 
21. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20. 
22. Frisaro, supra note 1. 
23. Id. 
24. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20; John Tkach, Three FAMU Band Members 
Charged, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2011, at C11, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 910500964. 
25. Tkach, supra note 24. 
26. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20. 
27. Tkach, supra note 24. 
28. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20. 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 5 
questions regarding the history of the clique.29  Both times, Hunter was 
struck across the legs with fists, metal rulers, and notebook binders.30  
Asked why band members took part in hazing rituals, Hunter answered, 
“[s]o we can be accepted . . . .  If you don’t do anything, then, it’s like 
you’re lame.”31  After Champion’s death, three band members were ar-
rested and charged for Hunter’s beating, which occurred off-campus at 
the apartment of James Harris who claimed to have, at one point, 
stopped the other two men from beating Hunter.32  Harris was charged 
with hazing.33  The other two men, nineteen-year-old Aaron Golson and 
twenty-three-year-old Sean Hobson, were charged with hazing and bat-
tery.34 
The lawsuit against thirteen members of the famed FAMU March-
ing 100 described two kinds of hazing that took place on the bus.35  First, 
in the ritual known as “Crossing Bus C,” students ran down the aisle 
from the front of the bus to the back while other students stood on the 
sides beating, slapping, and kicking them.36  Students who fell were 
kicked and stomped and then dragged back to the front of the bus to 
start over.37  According to one witness, large band members positioned 
themselves at the back of the bus to make the victim’s final steps the 
most difficult.38  The other ritual, called “the hot seat,” involved a pil-
lowcase being placed over the victim’s nose and mouth while he was 
forced to answer questions.39  Correct answers garnered a moment of re-
lief; incorrect answers meant another question with no chance to 
breathe in between.40 








35. Schneider, supra note 10. 
36. David Ariosto, FAMU Pledges Reforms After Report on Hazing, CNN WIRE, Jan. 
24, 2013, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 1359053358; Kyle Hightower & Mike Schneider, 
Band Mates Say FAMU Victim Volunteered to Be Hazed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23, 2012, 
available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 90333c02d7e6ce06e77e129b20233957; Schneider, supra note 
10. 
37. Schneider, supra note 10. 
38. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36. 
39. Schneider, supra note 10. 
40. Id. 
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6 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
nent of hazing within the Marching 100.41  His high school classmate and 
mentee, Bria Hunter, said Champion told her not to let anyone touch 
her.42  However, interviews with defendants and other band members re-
leased in late May suggested that Champion had volunteered to go 
through the hazing rituals.43  Champion sought to be the leader of the 
Marching 100, leading others who had already “Cross[ed] Bus C,” and 
some band members felt that meant Champion had to go through with 
the beating.44  According to defendant Caleb Jackson, “[i]f you go to 
that bus that’s saying that you wanted to do it.”45 
Although band members sign a pledge vowing not to participate in 
hazing, Champion and two other band members went through the ritual 
on the night of his death.46  According to defendant Jonathan Boyce, 
Champion said he intended to go through with it.47  Ryan Dean, a 
drummer who regularly rode Bus C, said that Champion told him earlier 
in the week he would “see [them] on the bus.”48  According to Boyce, 
“Champion was in the back[] getting kicked and punched” by the time 
he arrived, and Boyce and co-defendant Shawn Turner tried to shield 
Champion from the blows and get him to the back to end the ritual 
quickly.49 
Ultimately, when Champion’s parents brought a lawsuit against 
FAMU, the university, in its defense, insisted that it was Champion, not 
the school, who bore the ultimate responsibility for his hazing death be-
cause he consented to the hazing activities.50  Arguing that the judge 
should dismiss the lawsuit, the university argued that “[n]o public uni-
versity or college has a legal duty to protect an adult student from the 
result of their own decision to participate in a dangerous activity while 
off-campus and after retiring from university-sponsored events.”51 
While Robert Champion’s hazing death is in the context of collegiate 
 
41. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36. 
42. Blayne Alexander, Hazing Victim: ‘I Was Made an Example of,’ GANNETT NEWS 
SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 45904888. 
43. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36. 
44. Ariosto, supra note 36; Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36. 





50. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Florida: University Holds Drum Major Responsible for His 
Death in Hazing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A21. 
51. Id. 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 7 
band initiation rites, it provides a recent example of the broader context 
within which collegiate hazing often takes place—fraternities and sorori-
ties.  Accordingly, in this Article, we explore whether fraternity and so-
rority pledges can consent to hazing.  There has been some divergence 
on the topic in the law.  Most state hazing statutes have remained silent 
on the issue, and only a few courts have squarely addressed the issue.52  
Among the latter, courts presume that the psychological will of the haz-
ing victim has been overborne.53  However, these cases provide little in 
the way of engagement with psychological theory or research.  As such, 
in this Article, we investigate a range of psychological theories that may 
explain why hazing victims persist in their hazing experiences.  In Part 
II, we explore how victims’ consent is addressed in criminal, tort, and 
hazing case law and statutes.  In Part III, we highlight several psycholog-
ical theories which courts should consider when determining the extent 
to which, if at all, a hazing victim’s psychological will has been over-
come. 
II. THE LAW OF CONSENT 
This Part presents a brief summary of ways consent is viewed and 
addressed in criminal, civil, and hazing statutes.  Criminal law largely re-
jects consent as a defense in most cases, except in those areas of activity 
deemed appropriate by courts.54  Civil law permits consent as a defense, 
particularly where the victims assumed the risk of the activity in which 
they were harmed, or the injury was a foreseeable risk of participating in 
the activity.55  Hazing statutes often bar use of the victims’ consent as a 
defense by making it irrelevant.56  Others explicitly bar the defense or 
apply a presumption against consent or that hazing activity is per se 
forced.57 
A. Consent in Criminal Law: A General Approach 
Consent in criminal law has undergone a shift in its approach to 
rights and interests of the victim.  Prior to the seventeenth century, 
common law reflected the Roman law principle “‘volenti non fit injuria’ 
 
52. See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 177–78, 188–91 and accompanying text. 
54. See infra Part II.A. 
55. See infra Part II.B. 
56. See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
57. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
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8 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
(‘to a willing person, no injury is done’)” that allowed “individuals to 
consent to harm-causing acts,”58 making consent a complete bar to pros-
ecution.59  During the 1600s, criminal systems shifted from interests in 
the victims and their rights to a centralized judicial structure focused on 
the public good.60  “[A]cts that had been considered violations of a par-
ticular victim’s interests came to be viewed as . . . a ‘disturbance of the 
society,’” a view still echoed in today’s case law.61  This shift resulted in 
the state becoming the “ultimate victim and the sole prosecutor of [the] 
criminal act” and the removal of the actual victim from the criminal pro-
cess.62  As such, “an individual lost the power to consent to what the 
state regarded as harm to itself.”63 
Much of the literature on consent in criminal law centers on cases 
involving contact sports,64 sexual assault and rape,65 and sadomaso-
chism.66  Today, criminal law commonly rejects consent as a defense to 
most criminal assaults.67  However, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and 
other case law make exceptions “for assaults resulting in little or no in-
jury, sports, medical treatment, and body modification.”68  Even with 
these exceptions, criminal law favors a public policy where “a person 
 
58. Ryan G. Fischer et al., From the Legal Literature, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1137, 1145 
(2009) (quoting Randolf v. de Richmond, Y.B. 33 Edw., fol. RS 7-11, Mich., pl. 6, at 6–9 
(1305) (Eng.) (“to a willing man no injury is done”); Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: 
Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 171–72 (2007)). 
59. Vera Bergelson, Consent to Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 683, 686 (2008). 
60. Id.; Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145. 
61. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145 (quoting Bergelson, supra note 58, at 172); see 
also Bergelson, supra note 59, at 686. 
62. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 686. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, Lex Sportiva: Thoughts Towards a Criminal Law of Com-
petitive Contact Sport, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 35, 55 (2007); Ben Livings, A Different 
Ball Game—Why the Nature of Consent in Contact Sports Undermines a Unitary Approach, 
71 J. CRIM. L. 534, 534 (2007); Jeffrey Standen, The Manly Sports: The Problematic Use of 
Criminal Law to Regulate Sports Violence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 619, 620–21 
(2009). 
65. See, e.g., Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 333, 333 (2004). 
66. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 239, 239 (2001). 
67. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145; see generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 
(1985). 
68. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1139 (quoting Kelly Egan, Comment, Morality-Based 
Legislation Is Alive and Well: Why the Law Permits Consent to Body Modification but Not 
Sadomasochistic Sex, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1615, 1625 (2007)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.11(2). 
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cannot avoid criminal responsibility for an assault that causes injury or 
carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked for or consented 
to the act.”69  Courts have often found that consent is not a valid defense 
when criminal assaults are injurious to a person and constitute a breach 
of public peace.70  
In Taylor v. State, the court divided criminal assault into two classes: 
one that breaches the public peace generally and another that “is not ac-
companied by the threat of serious hurt or breach of the public peace,” 
and “is treated as a crime against the person.”71  There, the court found 
that there is no defense of consent when the criminal assault “tends to 
bring about a breach of the public peace” because the crime is treated as 
crime against the general public.72  However, where a criminal assault “is 
not accompanied by the threat of serious hurt or breach of the public 
peace . . . the consent of the person assaulted is held to be a good de-
fense, since the absence of consent is an essential element of the of-
fense.”73 
The court in Wright v. Starr similarly noted that the law punishes for 
criminal assault “even if consent is given . . . because consent to a bat-
tery is illegal as against the state, on account of the breach of public 
peace involved.”74  Likewise, a New Mexico court favored the public’s 
“stronger and overriding interest in preventing and prohibiting” violent 
acts over victims of crimes who “have so little regard for their own safe-
ty as to request injury.”75 
The MPC’s view on consent serves as the basis for the law in the ma-
jority of states.76  “The consent of the victim to conduct charged to con-
stitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent 
negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the 
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.”77  
For offenses that involve bodily harm, consent is not a defense even if it 
 
69. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1138 (quoting People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 
168 n.5 (App. Div. 1999)). 
70. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1138, 1145–46. 
71. Taylor v. State, 133 A.2d 414, 415 (Md. 1957). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Wright v. Starr, 179 P. 877, 878 (Nev. 1919). 
75. State v. Fransua, 510 P.2d 106, 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973). 
76. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 687 & n.29 (“Thirteen states explicitly recognize a gen-
eral defense of consent in their statutes.”). 
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1985); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5 (2d ed. 2003). 
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10 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
negatives an element of the offense.78  Instead, consent is a defense to 
conduct that “causes or threatens bodily injury,” or “the infliction of 
such injury” under the MPC in specific instances: (1) when “the bodily 
injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not se-
rious;” (2) “the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable haz-
ards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive 
sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law;” (3) the consent 
establishes a justification such as protection of property and self-
protection; and (4) when bodily harm is inflicted for “a recognized form 
of treatment” to improve a patient’s mental or physical health.79  Assent 
does not constitute consent if: (1) the assenter is “legally incompetent to 
authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense;” (2) the assent-
er is “unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harm-
fulness of the conduct;” (3) “it is induced by force, duress or deception 
of [the] kind” the law is trying to prevent; or (4) “it is given by a person 
whose improvident consent” the law is trying to prevent.80 
Consent as a defense is viewed by some legal scholars as more per-
missible in certain contexts than in others, often based on the definition 
and interpretation of a “serious” injury.81  Bodily injury is “serious” ac-
cording to the MPC and similarly worded statutes if it “creates a sub-
stantial risk of death or . . . causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ.”82  Bergelson posits that “courts habitually exaggerate the seri-
ousness of injury or pain and the risk of death in order to condemn an 
unwanted activity.”83  Courts seem more lenient in cases of religious 
flagellation and serious injuries resulting from contact sports because of 
the perceived social utility associated with such activities.84 
Commentary to MPC acknowledges that assessment of seriousness is 
impacted by “moral judgments about the iniquity of the conduct in-
volved.”85  Courts also suggest “that there is a variance in the way that 
 
78. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 687 (“This general rule, however, does not apply to of-
fenses involving bodily harm.”). 
79. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.11(2), 3.08(4)(a).  See generally id. § 3 (providing justifi-
cations for conduct that would otherwise be a criminal offense). 
80. Id. § 2.11(3). 
81. See Livings, supra note 64, at 534. 
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3). 
83. VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS: COMPARATIVE 
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2009). 
84. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1147. 
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 cmt. n.8. 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 11 
[offenses] are viewed within and [outside] the context of sport,” possibly 
resulting in “a higher threshold that must be reached before liability is 
imposed for [behavior] on the sports field.”86  In essence, if a harmful act 
is not athletic or medical, it may be criminal unless the injury is not seri-
ous.87  Thus, determining seriousness of an injury, as well as the court’s 
perception of the social utility of the activity in question, influences the 
outcomes of cases involving consensual harm.88 
B. Consent in Civil Law: A General Approach 
The First Restatement of Torts defines the tort of battery as an act 
with intent to bring about “a harmful or offensive contact,” without con-
sent or privilege.89  However, it was unclear from the First Restatement 
whether lack of consent was an element of a prima facie case for battery, 
and the corollary, whether consent was an affirmative defense to the 
claim.90  The Second Restatement worked to resolve this ambiguity by 
stating that when the defendant has a reasonable belief that the plaintiff 
has consented to the act, the defendant has apparent consent and is 
therefore entitled to a complete affirmative defense and is absolved of 
liability.91 
The Second Restatement clearly establishes that one who consents 
to an act “cannot recover . . . for the conduct or for harm resulting from 
it”; furthermore, any consent only applies to the conduct it is specifically 
related to, and any conduct beyond that covered by the consent can be 
the basis for tort recovery.92  The evolution of the defense of consent in 
battery torts has altered the role of consent as a successful defense, but 
ambiguities still exist in the policy and contractual nature of provided 
consent, which case law better illuminates. 
The issue of consent is especially common in battery torts arising 
from medical treatment.93  While additional issues of informed consent 
and intent arise in these circumstances, the basic principles of consent 
 
86. Livings, supra note 64, at 541. 
87. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 691. 
88. See id. 
89. Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controver-
sy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1605 (2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13(a) 
(1934)). 
90. Moore, supra note 89, at 1605, 1612. 
91. Id. at 1605 & n.112. 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979). 
93. See id. § 892A cmt. c, illus. 2; Moore, supra note 89, at 1646–49. 
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12 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
are still applicable in medical battery.  The court in Bradford v. Winter 
analyzed consent broadly, noting that consent can be express or im-
plied.94  In Bradford, a patient signed a form giving express consent to a 
doctor to complete a bronchoscopy, and additionally, to allow the doc-
tor to perform “any other procedure that his . . . judgment may dic-
tate.”95  The patient brought suit for battery after learning that the doc-
tor removed a specimen for biopsy during the bronchoscopy.96  The 
district court found that this was a normal procedure incident to the 
bronchoscopy and was within the bounds of the express consent given 
by the patient, and the appeals court affirmed.97  The broad consent giv-
en by the patient applied to a whole host of possible discretionary ac-
tions by the doctor and was therefore a complete bar to recovery by the 
patient.98 
In sports, participation is often conditioned on the player giving con-
sent and waiving any claims for injury.99  Agreements may cover injuries 
arising under normal circumstances in the sport or a whole host of antic-
ipated or unanticipated occurrences.100  Often these agreements, termed 
“releases,” are meant to eliminate any duty an organizer of an event has 
to the participant.101  However, they often do not speak of a duty owed 
by fellow participants.102  In Levine v. Gross, a karate student granted 
consent to release the karate studio from “some risk of personal injury” 
that covered “all liability in said course of instruction.”103  The student 
asserted that “some risk” did not cover the detached retinas he suffered 
that required surgery on both eyes.104  The court determined that the re-
lease was broad enough to cover those injuries and dismissed the ac-
tion.105  The court noted that the contract must be “clear, unequivocal, 
and unambiguous,” and that it must cover all incurred injuries that are 
 
94. Bradford v. Winter, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
95. Id. at 244, 246. 
96. Id. at 245. 
97. Id. at 246. 
98. Id.  
99. See Livings, supra note 64, at 547. 
100. Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory 
Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1997). 
101. Id. at 2, 8. 
102. See id. at 8. 
103. Levine v. Gross, 704 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
104. Id. at 263–64. 
105. Id. at 264. 
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claimed in the tort suit.106  The court made note of two important factors 
in its decision: first, that the participant was aware of the potential risks 
that could result from participating in karate because he had previously 
suffered, among other injuries, dislocated fingers, a knee injury that re-
quired surgery, and corneal abrasion; and second, that reckless miscon-
duct by a fellow participant may be a basis for a tort action.107  The plain-
tiff’s general knowledge of the potential for injury inherent in karate 
had eliminated any ambiguity in the assumption of risk in the release.108  
The court noted that “the standard of care rises as the inherent danger 
of the sport falls,” when examining the duty owed by participants to 
each other.109  In this case, the dangers inherent in karate were apparent-
ly so high as to warrant a limited duty of care by the participants.110 
The question naturally arises whether an act committed, which the 
injured party did not expressly consent to, can be the basis for a battery 
tort claim.  In such circumstances, the impact of intent in the battery 
claim is of utmost importance.  Some scholars have advocated for bat-
tery to require a single intent: the intent to cause unwanted or offensive 
contact.111  Others have argued that there must be a dual-intent element 
to battery: (1) the intent to cause the unwanted touch, and (2) the intent 
to cause harm or pain.112  This additional intent requirement could filter 
out cases where there was no consent, but the act that caused injury was 
not intended to produce such a result.  In these circumstances, were an 
injury to occur outside of the normal playing time in a sport without in-
tent to actually cause harm, no action could lie. 
Many courts have sidestepped this issue and focused on the consent 
of the injured party.113  Instead of searching for express consent, they 
find actual or implied consent, or assumption of risk.114  However, while 





109. Id. (quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ohio 1990)). 
110. Levine, 704 N.E.2d at 264. 
111. Moore, supra note 89, at 1637. 
112. See id. at 1632–37. 
113. See, e.g., Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. 1989) 
(discussing assumption of risk); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968–70 (N.Y. 1986) (discuss-
ing implied consent); Arbegast v. Bd. of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 365, 371 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing 
implied assumption of risk); Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 376 P.2d 406, 414 (Or. 1962) (dis-
cussing assumption of risk). 
114. See, e.g., Levine, 704 N.E.2d at 264. 
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14 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
courts often ambiguously use both terms and hold the injurer not liable 
for the injury.115  In Thompson v. Park River Corp., a child taking swim-
ming lessons was injured when he was pushed into the swimming pool 
by another child who was also taking lessons.116  The court found that 
even though the offending child had acted outside of the rules of the 
swimming lessons, he was not liable for two reasons.117  First, the act was 
not done recklessly or intentionally and was therefore lacking the requi-
site intent to injure for the battery claim to be sustained.118  Second, the 
injured child had assumed the risk of being injured because children’s 
swimming lessons often involve an inherent amount of “rambunctious 
behavior.”119 
The final circumstance that must be examined is in activities with 
rules that are intentionally broken in order to cause harm.  The court in 
Avila v. Citrus Community College District analyzed a sports-injury bat-
tery claim.120  There, a baseball pitcher threw an inside pitch and hit the 
batter in the head, apparently in retaliation for his team’s batter being 
struck in a previous inning.121  The court recognized that the rules of the 
game, which all participants had consented to, as well as the inherent 
risks in baseball, include the risk of being intentionally struck.122  The 
court cited precedent in acknowledging that intentional or reckless acts 
“totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport” 
are not covered by assumption of risk or implied consent.123  However, 
the court held that even if the pitch was intentional, the act did not fall 
completely outside of the purview of normal activity in the sport to war-
rant liability.124  The court reasoned that it is up to the umpires to en-
force the rules of the sport, and any judicial remedy for acts within the 
sport would have a chilling effect on the conduct of the game.125  On the 
issue of consent, the court equated the injury arising from the intention-
al striking of the batter with a pitch to a boxer accepting the risk of his 
 
115. See, e.g., Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 32; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968–70; Arbegast, 480 
N.E.2d at 371; Vendrell, 376 P.2d at 414. 
116. Thompson v. Park River Corp., 830 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
117. Id. at 1265–66. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1265. 
120. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 385–86 (Cal. 2006). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 394. 
123. Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992)). 
124. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394. 
125. Id. 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 15 
opponent’s jabs.126 
C. Consent in Hazing Law 
The act of “hazing” can be traced as far back as ancient Greece, 
where soldiers were forced to endure pain and punishment as a sign of 
their loyalty to the military.127  These hazing activities have since made 
their way into the United States and have become prevalent in military 
barracks, colleges, and high schools.128  Unfortunately, state legislatures 
have struggled to define criminal hazing because “[h]azing means many 
different things to different people.”129  However, the term has been 
broadly defined as “the act of putting another in a ridiculous, humiliat-
ing, or disconcerting position as part of an initiation process,”130 or as 
“any humiliating or dangerous activity expected . . . to join a group, re-
gardless of . . . willingness to participate.”131  Nevertheless, in 1901, Illi-
nois became the first state to pass an anti-hazing law when it enacted a 
statute criminalizing conduct “whereby any one sustains an injury to his 
[or her] person therefrom.”132  As of today, all but six states have fol-
lowed suit and enacted criminal or civil statutes that prohibit and punish 
hazing.133  Despite this move by states’ legislatures, scholars have found 
that there are several obstacles that impede the effectiveness of state an-
ti-hazing statutes, and, in turn, these obstacles have spurred changes in 
 
126. Id. at 395. 
127. Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A 
Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey’s Anti-Hazing Act, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 310–
11 (2008). 
128. Id. at 311–16 (noting that hazing has become more common in high schools, par-
ticularly among student-athletes). 
129. NADINE C. HOOVER, ALFRED UNIV., NATIONAL SURVEY: INITIATION RITES AND 
ATHLETICS FOR NCAA SPORTS TEAMS 24 (1999), available at http://www.alfred.edu/sports_
hazing/docs/hazing.pdf. 
130. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 308–09 (quoting Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Va-
lidity, Construction, and Application of “Hazing” Statutes, 30 A.L.R.5th 683, 683 (1995)). 
131. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 309 (omission in original) (quoting NADINE C. 
HOOVER & NORMAN J. POLLARD, ALFRED UNIV., INITIATION RITES IN AMERICAN HIGH 
SCHOOLS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2000), available at http://www.alfred.edu/hs_hazing/docs/
hazing__study.pdf). 
132. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 311–12 (alteration in original) (quoting 1901 Ill. Laws 
145; Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-
Collegiate Hazing, 61 MISS. L.J. 111, 118–19 (1991)). 
133. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 313.  States without anti-hazing statutes are Alaska, 
Montana, South Dakota, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Wyoming.  State Anti-Hazing Laws, 
STOPHAZING.ORG, http://stophazing.org/laws.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013). 
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16 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
legislation to overcome such barriers.134 
To remove the need for subjective inquiry into the facts of hazing 
cases, the legislatures of sixteen states have added provisions in anti-
hazing statutes that bar the victim-consent defense.135  Some states take 
the approach of applying a presumption against consent or a presump-
tion that hazing activity is per se forced activity.  For example, Pennsyl-
vania law applies a presumption against consent by providing that any 
activity that fits within the statutory definition of hazing is “presumed to 
be ‘forced’ activity, the willingness of an individual to participate in such 
activity notwithstanding.”136  Oklahoma’s anti-hazing statute states that 
any hazing activity is “presumed to be a forced activity, even if the stu-
dent willingly participates in such activity.”137  Utah’s anti-hazing statute 
also has a similar prohibition against the victim-consent defense by as-
suming that victims under the age of twenty-one are more vulnerable to 
peer pressure, thus prohibiting any consent to hazing by such persons.138 
Several states include in their anti-hazing statute a provision that 
makes the victim’s consent irrelevant.  For example, Iowa’s anti-hazing 
statute defines “forced activity” as “any activity which is a condition of 
initiation or admission into, or affiliation with, an organization, regard-
less of a student’s willingness to participate in the activity.”139  Georgia’s 
anti-hazing statute also contains a provision that forced activity is pro-
hibited “regardless of a student’s willingness to participate in such activi-
ty.”140  Wisconsin’s anti-hazing statute similarly states that “forced activi-
ty” is prohibited “regardless of a student’s willingness to participate in 
the activity.”141 
Perhaps an even stronger mechanism employed by a number of 
states is an explicit prohibition against the victim-consent defense in 
hazing cases.  Nevada’s anti-hazing statute provides that “[c]onsent of a 
 
134. See, e.g., Amie Pelletier, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current 
Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 377, 387 (2002). 
135. Id. at 386 & n.75. 
136. Id. at 386 (citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5352 (West 1992)).  Similarly, Delaware’s an-
ti-hazing statute mimics the same language, stating that any activity within the statutory defi-
nition of “hazing” is “presumed to be ‘forced’ activity, the willingness of an individual to par-
ticipate in such activity notwithstanding.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 9302 (2007). 
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (2002). 
138. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107.5(2) (Lex-
isNexis 1999)). 
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.10 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-61 (2011). 
141. WIS. STAT. § 948.51 (2011–2012). 
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2013] HAZING CONSENT 17 
victim of hazing is not a valid defense to a prosecution conducted [under 
the anti-hazing statute].”142  Missouri has a similar provision, which 
states that “[c]onsent is not a defense to hazing.”143  Vermont’s anti-
hazing statute states that “[i]t is not a defense . . . that the person against 
whom the hazing was directed consented to or acquiesced in the hazing 
activity.”144  Maryland’s anti-hazing provision also explicitly states that 
“[t]he implied or express consent of a student to hazing is not a de-
fense.”145 
Indiana provides the most explicit bar against the victim-consent de-
fense by stating that hazing involves the act of “forcing or requiring an-
other person . . . with or without the consent of the other person.”146  
West Virginia’s statute also provides a strong bar against the victim-
consent defense in any manner, stating that “the implied or expressed 
consent or willingness of a person or persons to hazing shall not be a de-
fense under this section.”147 
By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, 
these sixteen states have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from 
consideration, thus presumably allowing courts to effectively and 
properly adjudicate hazing cases.  Courts, however, have addressed the 
issue of consent in a limited number of instances.  For example, a mere 
handful of courts have found that fraternity pledges did not necessarily 
have their psychological will overpowered and were thus able to consent 
to the hazing they experienced. 
In Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex parte Barran), Jason Jones 
was an Auburn University student who chose to pledge the fraternity of 
Kappa Alpha.148  Jones claimed he was subjected to numerous hazing in-
cidents, such as jumping into ditches filled with water, urine, and feces; 
withstanding physical abuse; and appearing nightly at the fraternity 
house for two a.m. meetings to be hazed in a variety of ways.149  When 
Jones was suspended from school for poor academic performance, he 
 
142. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386–87 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.605(2) 
(LexisNexis  2001)). 
143. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.365 (West 2011). 
144. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 140b (2004). 
145. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-607 (LexisNexis 2012). 
146. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-2 (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added). 
147. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-16-2 (LexisNexis 2012). 
148. Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex parte Barran), 730 So. 2d 203, 204 (Ala. 
1998). 
149. Id. at 204–05. 
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18 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
brought suit against the fraternity for negligence, assault and battery, 
and the tort of outrage.150  The fraternity asserted the defense of assump-
tion of risk, alleging Jones voluntarily engaged in the hazing activities.151  
Jones claimed his participation was “not necessarily voluntary.”152 
The Supreme Court of Alabama sided with the fraternity and re-
manded the case with instruction for the trial court to grant its motion 
for summary judgment on the negligence claim.153  The supreme court 
found significant the facts that Jones (1) knew “between 20% and 40%” 
of his class had withdrawn from pledging, (2) knew of the hazing prac-
tices yet continued to show up for hazing events, and (3) covered up the 
hazing incidents to school officials and his doctors even though he knew 
the hazing would continue to occur.154  The court did not find persuasive 
Jones’s argument that “a coercive environment hampered his free will to 
the extent that he could not voluntarily choose to leave the fraternity.”155 
More recently, in Yost v. Wabash College, freshman Brian Yost suf-
fered physical and mental injuries and was forced to drop out of school 
due to an incident that occurred in connection with the Phi Psi fraterni-
ty.156  Yost, a Phi Psi pledge, decided to throw an upperclassman into a 
creek to celebrate the upperclassman’s birthday.157  The friendly horse-
play escalated until an upperclassman put Yost in a chokehold, at which 
time Yost lost consciousness.158 
Yost filed a personal injury action against the fraternity, the college, 
and the upperclassman.159  However, the court determined that since the 
incident was instigated by Yost, he was not coerced into any action, and, 
thus, the incident was not hazing.160  As such, the defendants breached 
no duty to Yost as a matter of law.161 
Jones and Yost are outliers, however, when compared to cases from 
other states.  For example, the issue of consent was addressed by a New 
 
150. Id. at 205. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 205–06. 
153. Id. at 208. 
154. Id. at 206–07. 
155. Id. at 207. 




160. Id. at 735. 
161. Id. at 745. 
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York court in the case of People v. Lenti (Lenti I).162  In Lenti I, the de-
fendants were charged under the New York criminal hazing statute for 
“[willfully], wrongfully and knowingly” assaulting victims by “striking 
them about the body and face with clenched fists, open hands, forearms 
and feet.”163  The defendants asserted the victim-consent defense, but 
the court dismissed such a defense and noted that in order for consent to 
be a successful defense, there must have been an affirmative act by the 
alleged victim which was not induced through either fraud or deceit and 
“that the act performed should not exceed the extent of the terms of 
consent.”164  The Lenti I court went on to note that even if the victim 
consented, “consent is not a carte blanche license to commit an una-
bridged assault.”165 
In People v. Lenti (Lenti II),166 the court expounded on the victim-
consent defense, explaining that “[c]onsent of the pledges certainly 
should not be a bar to prosecution” and that the victim-consent defense 
was not applicable in cases where “the public conscience and morals are 
shocked.”167  In addressing this issue of victims’ consent, the court in 
Lenti II proposed that the New York legislature amend the criminal 
hazing statute to include explicit language barring such defenses in haz-
ing cases in the state of New York.168  Several other courts have followed 
the reasoning laid out by the court in Lenti I and Lenti II and have re-
fused to allow consent to serve as a defense in hazing cases.169  Yet, in 
cases where there is no explicit statutory language barring the use of 
consent as a defense, hazing cases usually turn on the facts of the case 
and whether a jury decides that the victim-pledge voluntarily participat-
ed in the hazing activities.170 
 
162. People v. Lenti (Lenti I), 253 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1964). 
163. Id. at 11. 
164. Id. at 15. 
165. Id. 
166. People v. Lenti (Lenti II), 260 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1965). 
167. Id. at 287. 
168. Id. at 287–88. 
169. See, e.g., Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 667 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651–
53 (Sup. Ct. 1997).  In Oja, the court held that consumption of alcohol by a pledge during col-
lege fraternal organization hazing or initiation ritual may be considered involuntary.  Id.  
Thus, a survival action for conscious pain and suffering of a pledge who suffers fatal injuries 
as a result of ingestion is not barred where drinking is imposed upon pledges, and their obe-
dience extracted, as an express or implied condition of membership.  Id.  However, if con-
sumption is voluntary, an estate may only recover for any resulting economic loss.  Id. 
170. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386; see, e.g., Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex 
parte Barran), 730 So. 2d 203, 206–07 (Ala. 1998); see also supra notes 148–55 and accompa-
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20 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
In Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, William 
Quinn brought a negligence suit against Beta Theta Pi Fraternity after 
he suffered neurological damage to his hands and arms following a night 
of drinking.171  Quinn alleged that, as an eighteen-year-old freshman 
pledge, he was directed to drink a forty-ounce pitcher of beer without 
removing it from his lips, was brought to a tavern and instructed to drink 
from an eight-ounce whiskey bottle, and was placed on a hardwood 
floor to sleep after becoming unconscious.172  Quinn asserted that he was 
left asleep for fourteen hours before he awoke, went to a hospital, and 
registered a .25 blood-alcohol content (BAC).173  He was informed that, 
at its peak, his BAC was likely at near fatal levels.174 
In his complaint, Quinn alleged that the fraternity did more than 
simply furnish him with alcohol, but rather required him to drink past 
the point of intoxication to be initiated into the fraternity.175  The court 
agreed and held that the “plaintiff was coerced into being his own exe-
cutioner.”176  The court continued: 
 It is true that [Quinn] could have avoided the situation by 
walking away from the fraternity.  In that respect, [Quinn’s] ac-
tions in participating in the ceremony were voluntary.  Yet, as 
the complaint alleges, membership in the defendant fraternity 
was a “much valued status.”  It can be assumed that great social 
pressure was applied to [Quinn] to comply . . . perhaps to the ex-
tent of blinding [Quinn] to any dangers he might face.  To the ex-
tent that [Quinn] acted willingly, liability can be transferred to 
him under principles of comparative negligence.177 
In finding that Quinn had a cause of action against the fraternity, the 
court noted that “the social pressure that exists” when a student pledges 
a fraternity “is so great that compliance with initiation requirements 
places him or her in a position of acting in a coerced manner.”178 
In State v. Brown, Sherdene Brown was found guilty of complicity to 
 
nying text. 
171. Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 507 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 




175. Id. at 1197. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1198. 
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hazing under Ohio’s hazing statute.179  Brown was a member of Alpha 
Kappa Alpha at Kent State University when she “physical[ly] disci-
pline[d]” pledges by forcing them to stand on their heads, beating them 
with paddles, and smacking and striking pledges in the face and head.180  
Brown was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for complicity to haz-
ing.181  Brown appealed the indictment.182 
Brown argued that the pledges knew the pledging process involved 
physical discipline.183  Brown attempted to draw an analogy between the 
pledge process and “ordinary physical conduct incident to high contact 
sports,” where physical interaction is permitted due to consent of the 
participants.184  The court rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) the 
pledges did not consent to the degree of physical discipline used, and (2) 
the state of Ohio’s hazing statute did not include consent as a valid de-
fense.185 
In Nisbet v. Bucher, Michael Nisbet died after consuming alcohol as 
part of the initiation process for the St. Pat’s Board, a campus organiza-
tion at the University of Missouri at Rolla.186  His parents’ wrongful 
death action was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause 
of action, but they appealed alleging that, to gain membership on the St. 
Pat’s Board, their son was coerced into chugging excessive amounts of 
alcohol and was denied medical assistance once he became uncon-
scious.187 
The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed with the Illinois Court of 
Appeals’ reasoning in Quinn.188  The court stated that Nisbet was pres-
sured into drinking alcohol “for the specific purpose of inducing intoxi-
cation,” and such consumption was a requirement of his induction into 
the St. Pat’s Board.189  The court also recognized that even though 
Nisbet could have walked away, he was “blinded to the danger he was 
 
179. State v. Brown, 630 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
180. Id. at 400. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 404. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Nisbet v. Bucher, 949 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
187. Id. at 113–14. 
188. Id. at 116. 
189. Id. 
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facing” by the great social pressure applied by the St. Pat’s Board.190  
The court concluded that “[i]t is a question for the trier of fact as to 
what degree [he] was coerced by defendants to consume excessive quan-
tities of alcohol and as to what extent his will to make a conscious deci-
sion about his alcohol consumption was overcome.”191 
In Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, Charles Carpetta was a 
University of Toledo student pledging the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity 
when fraternity members ridiculed him by yelling and swearing at him; 
requiring him to go on a scavenger hunt to an adult bookstore, a gay 
bar, and a brothel; forcing him to sit alone in a dark room for extended 
periods of time; and forcing him to kneel in rats’ blood.192  When Carpet-
ta quit the pledge process and dropped out of school, he brought suit 
against the fraternity under Ohio’s hazing statute.193  The defendant fra-
ternity filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the statute’s 
term “acts of coercion” was unconstitutionally vague.194 
The court found that the term was not unconstitutionally vague be-
cause “coercing” simply meant any act that caused another person to 
engage in any act of initiation.195  The court ultimately held that Carpetta 
could recover for any physical harm inflicted by the acts of initiation, 
but not for any mental or emotional harm.196 
In Meredith v. Montgomery, Chad Meredith was a freshman at the 
University of Miami and was pledging the Epsilon Beta Chapter of the 
Kappa Sigma fraternity when he drowned while swimming across Lake 
Osceola.197  On the night of his death, he attended a party with the fra-
ternity’s grand master of ceremonies and the fraternity’s president.198  
The two fraternity officers decided they were going to swim in the lake 




192. Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 718 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Lucas 
Cnty. 1998). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1016. 
195. Id. at 1017. 
196. Id. at 1017, 1019. 
197. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Travis Montgomery’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant David May’s Joinder Therein at 2–3, Mere-
dith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004), 2003 WL 
25969631, at *1–2 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum]. 
198. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 197, at 2. 
199. Id. 
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asked if they were serious, but attempted the crossing and subsequently 
drowned.200 
Meredith’s family brought suit, and the two defendants sought sum-
mary judgment, arguing “[t]here is no duty to protect another adult 
from the consequences of his own voluntary acts.”201  The plaintiffs ar-
gued Meredith’s acts were not truly voluntary, citing a deposition by Jo-
el Epstein (founder of the U.S. Department of Education’s Higher Edu-
cation Center for Alcohol & Other Drug Prevention) in which Epstein 
admitted pledging causes the “pledges to do things that they would oth-
erwise be unwilling to do.”202  “The exercise of peer pressure, whether 
direct and confrontational or subtle and more disguised is particularly 
effective when it comes from the fraternity president . . . .”203  Presuma-
bly relying on Epstein’s deposition, the jury found in favor of Meredith 
and awarded his parents nearly seven million dollars each for their pain 
and suffering.204  The jury found that the defendants were each forty-five 
percent at fault, and Meredith was ten percent at fault.205 
As noted, most criminal law cases tend to reject consent as a defense 
except where the activity is deemed appropriate by courts.206  The civil 
law, on the other hand, permits consent as a defense, especially when 
the victim assumed the risk of the activity in which they were harmed or 
where injury was a foreseeable risk of participating in the activity.207  Of 
the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes, about one-third of them bar the 
use of the victim-consent defense by explicitly barring the defense, ap-
plying a presumption against consent or that hazing activity is per se 
forced.208 
 
200. Id. at 2–3. 
201. Id. at 4 (quoting Defendant, Travis Montgomery’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 7, Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004), 
2003 WL 25969630, at *4). 
202. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 197, at 5 n.1 (quoting Affidavit of Joel Epstein 
at 3, Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004), 
2003 WL 25969483, at *2). 
203. Affidavit of Joel Epstein, supra note 202, at 3. 
204. Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-11335, 2004 WL 5913350, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 
17, 2004). 
205. Defendant, Travis Montgomery’s, Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Final Judgment 
and to Enter Judgment in Accordance with Motion for Directed Verdict at 2, Meredith v. 
Montgomery, No. 02-11335, 2004 WL 5913352 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2004), 2004 WL 5913714, 
at *1. 
206. See supra Part II.A. 
207. See supra Part II.B. 
208. State Anti-Hazing Laws, supra note 133; see also Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386 & 
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III. HAZING CONSENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Few courts, if any, reference psychological theories related to why 
hazing victims may persist to participate in hazing activities.  Thus, 
courts fail to fully evaluate (1) the degree to which victims consented 
and (2) the extent to which victims’ psychological will was truly over-
come during the hazing experience.  This Part explores the psychologi-
cal theories that may explain why hazing victims consent to a range of 
hazing activities. 
A. Escalation of Commitment 
The phenomenon of “escalation of commitment” refers to situations 
where decision-makers commit additional resources to a failing course 
of action.209  An escalation of commitment situation is characterized by 
three essential features: costs of continuing the same course of action, 
opportunities for withdrawal, and uncertainty about the consequences 
of persistence and withdrawal.210  Researchers have found that escalation 
effects persist in both group as well as individual decision processes.211  
A variety of theories have been advanced to explain escalation of com-
mitment.  A synopsis of some theories is below. 
For example, self-justification theory, which is based on Festinger’s 
theory of cognitive dissonance, is the most prominent explanation for 
escalation behavior.212  Self-justification theory posits that decision mak-
ers are reluctant to admit that their earlier decisions were incorrect and 
thus invest additional resources in an attempt to demonstrate the cor-
rectness of those decisions.213  According to Staw and Ross, escalation 
tendencies are greatest when the decision maker is personally responsi-
ble for the failed course of action.214 
 
n.75 (indicating that sixteen states have anti-hazing statutes). 
209. See Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: 
Toward Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 39–40 (1992) (providing a review of 
the theoretical variations on the escalation of commitment). 
210. See id. at 40. 
211. E.g., Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Mak-
ing: A Prospect Theory Approach, in 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN 
DECISION PROCESSES 430, 430 (1993). 
212. See Brockner, supra note 209, at 43–49 (reviewing escalation research and finding 
support for the self-justification hypothesis). 
213. Id. at 40, 43. 
214. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, 
Prototypes, and Solutions, in 9 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39, 50–51 
(1987). 
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The effect of personal responsibility has since been investigated un-
der a variety of situations, with the results generally supportive of Staw 
and Ross’s proposition.  For example, Whyte’s 1993 study hypothesized, 
inter alia, that “[e]scalating commitment to a failing project will occur in 
individual and group decision making regardless of personal responsibil-
ity” for sunk costs.215  Whyte found that although personal responsibility 
was not strictly necessary, it did significantly increase escalation.216 
The 1994 study by Bobocel and Meyer offered greater empirical in-
sight on the impact of personal responsibility (operationalized as choice) 
and justification on escalation of commitment.217  Bobocel and Meyer 
noted that most previous research confounded personal responsibility 
and public justification.218  The purpose of their study was to separate the 
effects of choice, private justification, and public justification on the de-
cision of whether or not to persist in a failed course of action.219  Results 
showed that choice exerts no significant effect on escalating commit-
ment but that both private and public justifications significantly increase 
escalation of commitment to the same extent.220  At first blush, it would 
seem that the desire to appear consistent—either to others or oneself—
is a powerful motive for escalation behaviors.  However, because escala-
tion of commitment occurred even when individuals did not justify their 
behavior to anyone else, Bobocel and Meyer concluded that “public jus-
tification is not necessary for escalating commitment and that private 
justification is sufficient.”221 
Escalation tendencies may also be partly explained by expectancy 
theory, which asserts that decision makers assess the subjective expected 
utility of allocating additional resources based on estimates of the value 
of goal attainment (i.e., rewards minus costs) and the probability that 
additional resources will help attain that goal.222  Accordingly, “if the 
reasons for the negative feedback [are perceived to be] unstable rather 
than stable,” then the decision maker would consider the probability of 
 
215. Whyte, supra note 211, at 437. 
216. Id. at 445–46. 
217. D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course 




220. Id. at 362. 
221. Id. 
222. Brockner, supra note 209, at 40. 
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goal attainment to be more favorable and would therefore be more like-
ly to commit additional resources.223 
Prospect theory has been proposed as an alternative explanation to 
self-justification for the behavior associated with escalation of commit-
ment in individual and group settings.224  Prospect theory describes how 
people actually behave when confronted with loss situations.225  Accord-
ing to this theory, individuals are risk seeking when choosing between 
two losing options but risk averse when choosing between two winning 
options.226  Thus, the action one takes may depend upon how the prob-
lem is framed.227  If the decision is perceived to be in the positive direc-
tion (i.e., it will generate gains), then individuals typically react in a risk-
averse manner.228  Thus, in this paradigm, a decision maker would prefer 
“a sure win of $50 over a 50 percent chance to win $100 and a 50 percent 
chance to win $0.”229  By contrast, if the decision is perceived to be in the 
negative direction (i.e., it will generate losses), then individuals will react 
in a risk-seeking manner.230  Thus, decision makers in this paradigm 
would prefer “to take a 50 percent chance on losing $100 and a 50 per-
cent chance of losing $0 than to accept a sure loss of $50.”231   
In his 1993 study, Whyte contends that prospect theory provides a 
more compelling justification for escalation behaviors than does self-
justification theory.232  Whyte’s contention is premised on the assump-
tion that individuals facing an escalation dilemma are loss averse.233  
Thus, according to Whyte, individuals facing escalation situations prefer 
to allocate additional resources and increase the probability of a larger 




224. Id. at 50. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979)) (noting that unlike the traditional 
model’s assumption of risk neutrality, people tend to be risk averse in the domains of gains, 
risk seeking in the domains of losses, and more risk sensitive to losses than to gains). 





232. Whyte, supra note 211, at 448. 
233. Id. at 433. 
234. Id. 
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Professor Bowen’s decision dilemma theory has also been offered to 
explain escalation behaviors.235  Bowen suggested that in previous esca-
lation research, including Staw’s seminal study in 1976, decision makers 
received equivocal, rather than negative, feedback about their initial re-
source allocation.236  Accordingly, decision dilemma theory posits that 
people escalate not in response to negative feedback, but in response to 
feedback that can be interpreted in multiple ways.237  As such, escalation 
behavior is more of a response to a dilemma than it is an act of error be-
cause investing additional resources may allow additional opportunities 
for a strategy to work, or allow the collection of more information and 
the passage of time, which may lead to greater understanding of the sit-
uation.238 
Self-presentation theory is yet another explanation for escalating 
commitment.  Self-presentation theory focuses on the effects of an on-
looking audience on escalation.239  Proponents of this theory contend 
that decision makers escalate commitment to failed courses of action 
because they want to be perceived as able to reach suitable choices.240  
Thus, they respond to escalation dilemmas by allocating additional re-
sources because departing from a previous pursuit may compromise 
credibility.241 
Proponents of self-presentation theory also maintain that organiza-
tional culture influences escalating commitment.242  Studies on employ-
ees and organizational culture have found that employees typically act 
in a manner that is consistent with the organizational values, which is in 
part a reflection of a self-presentation motive.243  Thus, escalation is 
more likely to occur in organizations that have a culture that makes 
people unwilling to admit failure or that values consistency in behav-
 
235. Brockner, supra note 209, at 52 (citing Michael G. Bowen, The Escalation Phenom-
enon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 52 
(1987)). 
236. Bowen, supra note 235, at 52; Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study 
of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUM. 
BEHAV. 27 (1976); Staw & Ross, supra note 214, at 52–54. 
237. Brockner, supra note 209, at 54. 
238. Id. at 53–54. 
239. Id. at 56. 
240. See id. 
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ior.244  However, escalation is less likely in organizations where people 
are free to admit errors or that value experimentation.245 
B. Groupthink 
Street and Anthony posit a theoretical relationship between group-
think and escalation of commitment models.246  Groupthink is a deficient 
group decision-making process that has a high probability of producing 
poor decisions with disastrous consequences.247  Groupthink occurs when 
“concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive [in-group] 
that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of ac-
tion.”248  There are three antecedent conditions to groupthink behavior: 
(1) group cohesiveness; (2) a provocative situational context; and (3) 
structural faults of the organization.249  The first, and most important, an-
tecedent condition of groupthink is cohesiveness (i.e., de-
individuation).250  A moderate to high level of group cohesion is neces-
sary, though insufficient by itself, for the development of groupthink.251 
The second antecedent condition, a provocative situational context, 
arises when the group has low group self-esteem and is required to make 
consequential decisions under high stress.252  Low group self-esteem is 
induced by the group’s previous failing decisions that raise questions 
about the group’s competence and moral standards.253  High stress re-
sults from external threats, with little chance of the group developing 
better decisions than the ones that led to previous failures.254  External 
threats, such as navigating a crisis situation, are said “to increase the 




246. Marc D. Street & William P. Anthony, A Conceptual Framework Establishing the 
Relationship Between Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior, 28 SMALL GROUP 
RES. 267, 268–69 (1997). 
247. See id. at 270 (citing Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 
43, 43). 
248. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 270 (alteration in original) (quoting Janis, su-
pra note 247, at 43). 
249. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 270–72. 
250. Id. at 270. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 272. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. (citing Paul ‘t Hart, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 
247, 257–59 (1991); Chris P. Neck & Gregory Moorhead, Jury Deliberations in the Trial of 
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The third antecedent condition for the development of groupthink 
concerns structural faults of the organization.256  These structural faults 
involve: (1) insulation from critical evaluation and analysis by other sig-
nificant group members; (2) inadequate decision-making procedures, to 
include the absence of procedures for searching for information, investi-
gating consequences, and proposing alternative actions; (3) a lack of im-
partial leadership; and (4) a lack of diversity in backgrounds or ideolo-
gies.257 
Street and Anthony put forward four assumptions that underlie the 
alleged theoretical link between groupthink and escalation of commit-
ment.258  First, they redefine the concept of group cohesion.  Previous re-
searchers have maintained that cohesion is comprised of three dimen-
sions: interpersonal attraction, pride in or desire for group membership, 
and task cohesion.259  The definition put forth by Street and Anthony 
consists of only the first two dimensions (interpersonal attraction and 
pride in group membership).260 
Second, they assume that the group is cohesive in the way defined 
above and simultaneously “suffers from one of the other two sets of an-
tecedent conditions in the groupthink model before [being] exposed to 
an escalation situation.”261  Third, citing the 1993 study by Glenn Whyte, 
they assume that escalation behaviors can and do occur at the group 
level.262  Fourth, they assume that group cohesion, as defined in the first 
assumption, increases the tendency to escalate commitment to failing 
courses of action.263 
Next, Street and Anthony put forth three propositions, each of 
which combines variables from the groupthink model with a corre-
sponding set of escalation variables.264  Each proposition assumes that 
the group is cohesive as defined by the first assumption above.265  The 
first proposition concerns a group with moderate to high levels of cohe-
 
U.S. v. John DeLorean: A Case Analysis of Groupthink Avoidance and an Enhanced Frame-
work, 45 HUM. REL. 1077, 1077–80 (1992)). 
256. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 272. 
257. See id. 
258. Id. at 276–79. 
259. Id. at 276. 
260. Id. at 277. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 278 (citing Whyte, supra note 211, at 430). 
263. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 279. 
264. Id. at 279–86. 
265. Id. 
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sion that is “suffering from conditions consistent with the provocative 
situational context . . . before it is exposed to an escalation situation.”266  
Thus, the cohesive group is suffering from “stress from external events, 
low levels of self-esteem, and pressures for concurrence-seeking actions 
among members prior to being exposed to an escalation situation.”267  
According to Street and Anthony, the escalation situation increases 
stress levels, exacerbating the group’s low self-esteem, and thereby in-
creases the group’s concurrence-seeking tendencies.268  Relying on the 
self-justification and face-saving theories of escalating commitment, 
Street and Anthony posit that the group will respond to this precarious 
situation by escalating commitment to their failing course of action.269  
Street and Anthony explain, in essence, that the group’s behavior is a 
defense mechanism for coping with decisional stress.270  For those rea-
sons, Street and Anthony’s first proposition contends that cohesive 
groups suffering from high stress or low self-esteem are more likely to 
escalate commitment to failed actions than are cohesive groups not suf-
fering from those conditions.271 
The second proposition concerns a highly cohesive group that is sub-
ject to various elements of the structural faults group of antecedent con-
ditions in the groupthink model before being exposed to an escalation 
situation.272  The presence of any one of the four structural faults is said 
to reduce the probability of the group engaging in a rational assessment 
of its alternatives before making a decision.273  Street and Anthony con-
tend that this phenomenon is greater when a group faces an escalation 
situation.274  They explain that while the lack of structural constraints 
within the organization alone retards rational assessment, the additional 
presence of the psychological and social determinants that urge escala-
tion behaviors further increases the probability that the group will arrive 
at a decision based upon irrational considerations (i.e., considering sunk 
 




270. Id. at 280–81. 
271. Id. at 282. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 284.  For the four types of structural faults, see supra note 257 and accompa-
nying text. 
274. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 284. 
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costs).275  This interaction between the structural faults, “the self-
justification, information-processing distortion, and face-saving” varia-
bles ultimately increases commitment to previous bad decisions.276  
Street and Anthony’s second proposition asserts that cohesive groups 
operating with structural faults are more likely to escalate commitment 
to failed decisions than groups not operating with structural faults.277 
To summarize briefly, the first proposition concerned the interactive 
effects of group cohesion and a provocative situational context, while 
the second proposition focused on the interactive effects of group cohe-
sion and structural faults.  According to Street and Anthony, those two 
propositions demonstrated the relationship between the two sets of an-
tecedent variables and the concomitant social and psychological deter-
minants in the escalation model.278  They ultimately contended that 
groups characterized by those antecedent conditions are more likely to 
escalate commitment to failed courses of action than groups not charac-
terized by those antecedent conditions.279 
Street and Anthony’s third proposition was simply a combination of 
the previous two.280  It asserts that cohesive groups characterized by the 
presence of all of the antecedent conditions of groupthink are more like-
ly to escalate commitment to failed actions than are cohesive groups 
who are not characterized by all of the antecedent conditions of group-
think.281 
C. Evolutionary Psychology 
Spoor and Kelly’s 2004 article situates the phenomenon of group 
members developing shared moods and emotions (collectively referred 
to under the umbrella term of “affect” or “group affect”) in the context 
of evolutionary history.282  Spoor and Kelly suggest that affect in groups 
has primarily served as a coordination function.283  This coordination 
 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 285. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 286. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 286–87. 
281. Id. at 286. 
282. Jennifer R. Spoor & Janice R. Kelly, The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in 
Groups: Communication and Group Bonding, 7 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 
398, 398 (2004). 
283. Id. at 401. 
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function can take one of two forms.284  “First, group members’ various 
affective reactions can quickly provide information about the environ-
ment, group structure, and group goals to other group members . . . .”285  
In other words, shared affect coordinates group members through a 
communication function.  Second, shared affect can mobilize efforts to-
ward group goals through fostering group bonds and group loyalty.286  
“These two functions of group [affect] are closely related and mutually 
reinforcing.”287 
Spoor and Kelly contend that the development of mechanisms such 
as emotional contagion and interaction synchrony have been advanta-
geous for group survival throughout evolutionary history.288  Emotional 
contagion refers to the automatic processes through which individuals 
mimic and synchronize their facial expressions, vocalizations, posture, 
and movements with those of other individuals in the group.289  One con-
sequence of such mimicry is the “convergence [of] mood and emotions 
across group members,” resulting in a homogenous emotional state 
throughout the group.290 
Spoor and Kelly also use an evolutionary perspective to explain the 
differing adaptive benefits of positive and negative affective states.291  
Communication of positive affective states had the effect of promoting 
cooperation within groups, while communicating negative affective 
states had the effect of promoting collective action in response to nega-
tive aspects in the environment.292  Thus, because negative emotional 
states typically “conveyed critical survival information about the envi-
ronment, group members may be particularly aware of the presence of 
negative emotions within the group.”293 
Spoor and Kelly also contend that group members profited from the 
development of affect regulation and control mechanisms that maintain 






288. See id. at 401–02. 
289. Id. at 402. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 402–03. 
292. Id. at 402–03, 405. 
293. Id. at 403. 
294. Id. at 404. 
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plicit affect regulation strategies can function to communicate the 
group’s status hierarchies, as well as its larger group goals.295  This aspect 
of the communicative function highlights the importance of both ho-
mogenous and heterogeneous levels of affect within the group.  Homog-
enous levels of affect in a group might be important for the pursuit of 
specific group goals.296  By contrast, affect regulation to communicate 
status differences stresses the importance of heterogeneous levels of af-
fect within groups.297 
Spoor and Kelly propose that the second primary function of shared 
affect in groups is to coordinate group action through facilitating the de-
velopment of group member bonds and group loyalty.298  In explaining 
group affect, Spoor and Kelly focus on two constructs: group cohesion 
and group rapport.299  Group cohesion is a “multi-dimensional construct 
that includes positive interpersonal interaction, task commitment, and 
group pride.”300  Ultimately, “the development of group cohesion serves 
to create bonds between group members, loyalty to the groups, and pos-
itive feelings toward tasks that the group completes together.”301 
Group rapport is similar to group cohesion and has three compo-
nents: “mutual attention and involvement, coordination among partici-
pants in the interaction, and positive affect.”302  Spoor and Kelly contend 
that developing group rapport is beneficial to group survival for several 
reasons.303  First, experiencing group rapport makes members “more at-
tentive and easily influenced by each other,” suggesting that the devel-
opment of group rapport influences group members’ susceptibility to 
emotional contagion.304  Second, the coordination component of group 
rapport is identical to interaction synchronization, suggesting that 
“group rapport can be indexed by regulation of the interaction that co-
ordinates the behavior of participants and provides predictable patterns 
of behavior.”305  Third, “[t]he final component of group rapport, positive 
 
295. Id. 
296. See id. at 405. 
297. See id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 405–06. 
300. Id. (citing Brian Mullen & Carolyn Cooper, The Relation Between Group Cohesive-
ness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 220–21, 225 (1994)). 
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affect, is closely tied to group cohesiveness” and affects group stability.306  
Taken together, the group cohesion and rapport determine the strength 
of the social bonds within a group and in turn the group’s ability or ina-
bility to effectively coordinate the pursuit of group goals.307 
The 2007 study by Peters and Kashima provides further insight on 
the communication function of shared affect by examining the role of 
emotional sharing (i.e., the social sharing of emotional social talk).308  
Results of their study revealed that emotional sharing can perform a 
function (affecting what they call the “social triad”) by creating links be-
tween people, informing them about their shared position in the envi-
ronment, and coordinating social action.309  In other words, the simple 
act of sharing an emotional experience can create unique bonds between 
the audience and the narrator, and in turn foster a shared understanding 
of the world.310  This shared understanding of the world can be used to 
unite previously separate groups in coordinated social action.311 
D. Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics 
Bosson and colleagues conducted an empirical test on the folk belief 
that shared positive feelings—as opposed to shared negative feelings—
facilitate stronger bonds between two people.312  Contrary to folk wis-
dom, they proposed that two people sharing a dislike of a target person 
would promote closeness more readily than sharing a liking for that tar-
get.313  The power of shared negativity in friendship formation was tested 
by measuring and manipulating the extent to which people shared spe-
cific negative and positive attitudes about others.314  Study 1 and Study 2 
required participants to list the positive and negative attitudes that they 
 
306. Id. 
307. See id. 
308. Kim Peters & Yoshihisa Kashima, From Social Talk to Social Action: Shaping the 
Social Triad with Emotion Sharing, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 780, 780 (2007). 
309. Id. at 780, 786, 790 (reporting and discussing results of Study 1 and Study 2, which 
focused on the three simultaneous consequences of emotion sharing). 
310. Id. at 791–92 (reporting and discussing the results of Study 3, which extended the 
two previous studies to confirm that the creation of the shared worldview was in fact due to 
emotion sharing). 
311. See id. at 793–95 (reporting and discussing the results of Study 4, which extended 
the three previous studies to confirm that emotion sharing does in fact lead to the creation of 
coalitions). 
312. Jennifer K. Bosson et al., Interpersonal Chemistry Through Negativity: Bonding by 
Sharing Negative Attitudes About Others, 13 PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 135, 135 (2006). 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 137. 
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shared with their closest friends.315  Results revealed that people tend to 
recall a larger proportion of shared negative than positive attitudes 
about others.316 
Study 3 examined the causal link between the discovery of shared 
negatives about others and interpersonal attraction.317 
Participants first indicated both a positive and a negative attitude 
toward a fictitious target person and then learned that they 
shared either their positive or their negative attitude about the 
target with another participant whom they believed they would 
soon meet.  Participants then rated their feelings of closeness to 
the other participant.318 
Results showed that discovering a shared negative attitude about a tar-
get person predicted liking for a stranger more strongly than discovering 
a shared positive attitude, but only when attitudes were weak.319  In oth-
er words, when people discovered that they shared a strong attitude 
about the stranger, they felt close to the stranger regardless of whether 
the attitude was positive or negative. 
Taken together, these results suggest that a strong negative attitude 
about a target can be a powerful bonding agent during friendship for-
mation.  Bosson and colleagues posited that their findings suggest that 
one of the functions of negative attitudes is the establishment of in-
groups and outgroups.320  In the context of their study, this means that 
the discovery of a shared dislike for another person fosters a sense of in-
group solidarity that meets people’s fundamental need for connected-
ness and belonging. 
Dion’s 1973 study presented the question of what is responsible for 
ingroup bias.321  Dion hypothesized that “ingroup cohesion would in-
crease discrimination toward an outgroup” and, extending past prior re-
searchers, proposed that this relationship may be explained in terms of 
the intergroup relations theories propounded by Sherif and Tajafel.322 
 
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 140. 
317. Id. at 143. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 146. 
320. Id. at 137. 
321. Kenneth L. Dion, Cohesiveness as a Determinant of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias, 28 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 163–64 (1973). 
322. Id.; see also Muzafer Sherif, Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup 
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Sherif’s theory posits that competition between groups leads to in-
tragroup cohesion and intergroup hostility.323  Further, subsequent re-
search on Sherif’s theory suggested that competition produced outgroup 
hostility because highly cohesive groups became more frustrated by 
competition than groups with low cohesion.324  Tajafel’s theory contends 
that discrimination toward the outgroup was a product of a “generic” 
group norm that one ought to favor the ingroup over the outgroup.325 
Results failed to support Dion’s hypothesis that increasing group co-
hesiveness would increase exploitation and devaluation of the out-
group.326  Dion conceded that the results of his study do not necessarily 
contradict Sherif’s theory; rather, he suggested that the inconsistent re-
sult was due to the fact that the inferences he drew from Sherif’s theory 
and subsequent empirical studies were inapplicable to his experimental 
design.327  He explained that if intergroup bias were a product on a “ge-
neric” ingroup-outgroup norm, then it would necessarily follow that in-
creasing cohesion would lead to greater conformity to the “generic” 
norm and, in turn, greater exploitation and devaluation of the out-
group.328 
Dion’s study also investigated “whether persons in highly cohesive 
groups exhibit greater cooperativeness and admiration toward their 
[group members] than do those in less cohesive groups,” as well as 
“whether the differential bias toward ingroup versus outgroup [mem-
bers] is more accentuated in highly cohesive groups than in less cohesive 
ones.”329  The results showed that members of high-cohesive groups ex-
hibit differential biases toward ingroup and outgroup in that high levels 
of cohesion produced significantly greater cooperation toward the in-
group than toward the outgroup.330  Moreover, members of high-
cohesive groups evaluated their fellow members more positively than 
 
Conflict, 63 AM. J. SOC. 349 (1958); Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination, 
SCI. AM., Nov. 1970, at 96. 
323. Dion, supra note 321, at 163; Sherif, supra note 322, at 350. 
324. Dion, supra note 321, at 163 (noting a study “finding that persons in highly cohesive 
groups are more overtly hostile toward a frustrating agent than individuals in less cohesive 
groups” (citing Albert Pepitone & George Reichling, Group Cohesiveness and the Expression 
of Hostility, 8 HUM. REL. 327, 336 (1955))). 
325. Dion, supra note 321, at 164; Tajfel, supra note 322, at 98–99. 
326. Dion, supra note 321, at 168. 
327. Id. at 169. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 164. 
330. Id. at 166. 
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they did members of an outgroup.331  Members of low-cohesive groups 
did not as strongly exhibit either of these biases toward ingroup favorit-
ism.332 
Dion interpreted the results as supporting a cognitive differentiation 
hypothesis.333  That is, “high cohesiveness leads group members to cogni-
tively differentiate their ingroup from the outgroup,” while low-
cohesion group members fail to perceive themselves and their fellow 
members as comprising an ingroup.334 
Karawasa hypothesized that cohesion facilitates social comparison, 
which in turn increases ingroup favoritism.335  Results largely supported 
this hypothesis.336  Inferiority significantly decreased ingroup favoritism 
in groups with low cohesion, whereas inferiority increased ingroup fa-
voritism in groups with high cohesion.337  Thus, the effect of feelings of 
inferiority on intergroup behavior is dependent upon the level of cohe-
sion in the group. 
In groups with low cohesion, members respond to knowledge of in-
group inferiority by cognitively denying their membership and ultimate-
ly derogating and departing from the ingroup.338  According to Ka-
rasawa, this low ingroup enhancement motivation (i.e., the lack of a 
desire to rate the ingroup positively in response to an identity threat) is 
experienced because members do not strongly identify with the group.339  
By contrast, groups with high cohesion respond to knowledge that their 
ingroup is inferior on a certain dimension by enhancing their ingroup 
evaluations on a different dimension.340  It is important to note that these 
effects are only observed when the outgroup is a relevant comparator 
for the ingroup.341 
Karasawa interpreted the results as suggesting that cohesiveness of 




333. Id. at 169. 
334. Id. 
335. Minoru Karasawa, Effects of Cohesiveness and Inferiority upon Ingroup Favoritism, 
30 JAPANESE PSYCHOL. RES. 49, 49 (1988). 
336. Id. at 54–55. 
337. Id. at 55–56. 
338. Id. at 57. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. at 51, 58. 
341. Id. at 51. 
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group inferiority) on ingroup evaluations.342  That is, facilitating identifi-
cation with the group can protect low-status group members from in-
group devaluation and promote their ingroup enhancement motiva-
tions.343 
A recent study by Castano and colleagues merges insights from Ter-
ror Management Theory (TMT) and social identity theory to argue that 
ingroup members identify more with ingroup when they were reminded 
of the inevitability of their own death.344  Results yielded support for this 
proposition.345  The results also “showed that ingroup bias was associated 
both with ingroup identification and ingroup entitativity,” confirming 
previous studies that examined these relationships more directly.346 
Castano and colleagues interpreted this finding as providing evi-
dence for the hypothesis that entitativity and identification are distinct 
though related concepts.347  Identification with the group is said to pro-
vide psychological protection against the fear engendered by knowledge 
of personal mortality.348  Perceived entitativity allegedly allows one to 
transcend notions of personal mortality by shifting from a personal to a 
social identity, because, in contrast to personal identity, social identity is 
not subject to mortal fate.349 
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje investigated how ingroup identifica-
tion affects fidelity to the group.350  Social identity and self-
categorization perspectives suggest that fidelity to one’s group is deter-
mined by the group’s status, the need for esteem, and the objective 
availability of alternatives.351  Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje proposed, 
however, that fidelity to one’s group was a function of psychological 
commitment stemming from the importance of that particular group to 
 
342. Id. at 58. 
343. Id. 
344. Emanuele Castano et al., I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, In-
group Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 135, 136–37 
(2002). 
345. Id. at 138–40. 
346. Id. at 141. 
347. Id. at 140. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears & Bertjan Doosje, Sticking Together or Falling 
Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus 
Individual Mobility, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 617 (1997). 
351. Id. at 617–18. 
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the member’s identity.352  This perspective differed from previous re-
search on individual mobility because it proposed that ingroup identifi-
cation is a cause, rather a consequence, of one’s inclination to engage in 
individual or intergroup behaviors.353 
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje conducted two experiments designed 
to test the effects of ingroup identification on perceived intragroup ho-
mogeneity, group commitment, and the desire for individual mobility.354  
In the first experiment, the participants were members of a low-status 
ingroup, with either permeable (i.e., flexible group memberships) or im-
permeable boundaries (i.e., fixed group memberships).355  Low identifi-
ers perceived the group as less homogenous, were less committed to the 
group, and had more of a desire for individual mobility to the status 
group.356  The exact opposite result was observed for high identifiers.357 
The second study investigated the minimal conditions that are need-
ed for the emergence of ingroup identification effects.358  Thus, in this 
condition, the relative status of the group was unknown to the partici-
pants.359  Results revealed that even in the absence of an identity threat, 
low identifiers were less likely to see the group as homogenous, had less 
commitment to the group, and had a stronger desire for individual mo-
bility than high identifiers.360  These results added further support to the 
claim that the psychological factors, as opposed to the objective struc-
tural features, determine commitment to one’s group.361 
These results suggest that identification with the ingroup is a power-
ful determinant of the desire for individual social mobility, irrespective 
of threats to one’s social identity.362  High identifiers see the group as a 
homogenous unit and remain committed even when it would be person-
ally profitable to abandon the group.363  Low identifiers, by contrast, 
emphasize the differences of individual group members and, at best, ex-
 
352. Id. at 618. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. at 619, 621. 
356. Id. at 621. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. at 622. 
359. Id. at 623. 
360. Id. at 624. 
361. Id. at 624–25. 
362. Id. at 625. 
363. Id. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  3:41 PM 
40 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
hibit indifference to continued group membership under both threaten-
ing and more neutral (i.e., uncertain status) conditions.364 
In a 1999 article, Ellemers and colleagues analyzed and distinguished 
the components of social identity.365  Social identity, as defined by Tajfel, 
is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that member-
ship.”366  According to Ellemers and colleagues, this definition suggests 
that three separate components contribute to one’s social identity: “a 
cognitive component (a cognitive awareness of one’s membership in a 
social group—self-categorisation), an evaluative component (a positive 
or negative value connotation attached to this group membership—
group self-esteem), and an emotional component (a sense of emotional 
involvement with the group—affective commitment).”367 
Next, Ellemers and colleagues argued that each aspect of social iden-
tity is differentially affected by specific group characteristics or the so-
cial context, namely relative group size, relative group status, and 
whether membership in the group was assigned as opposed to achieved 
or self-selected.368  To test this assumption, they manipulated assignment 
criteria (self-selected versus assigned), membership status (high versus 
low), and the relative size (majority versus minority) of artificially creat-
ed groups.369 
Results confirmed that the evaluative component of social identity, 
group self-esteem, is only affected by the relative status of the ingroup.370  
Self-categorization, the cognitive dimension of social identity, is solely 
dependent upon the relative size of the ingroup.371  Members of minority 
groups report both strong self-categorization as group members and 
strong personal identification.372  Ellemers and colleagues explained that 
 
364. Id. 
365. Naomi Ellemers et al., Self-Categorisation, Commitment to the Group and Group 
Self-Esteem as Related but Distinct Aspects of Social Identity, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 
371 (1999). 
366. Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, Social 
Identity and Social Comparison, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS 61, 63 
(Henri Tajfel ed., 1978)). 
367. Ellemers et al., supra note 365, at 372. 
368. Id. at 373–75. 
369. Id. at 377–78. 
370. Id. at 380. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 380–81. 
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the fact that strong group identity can be observed even when the group 
purportedly has low value connotation suggests that self-categorization 
and group self-esteem are relatively independent and that group self-
esteem does not necessarily lead people to avoid self-categorization.373  
Finally, the data on affective commitment, “the emotional aspect of so-
cial identification,” showed that group commitment “depend[s] both on 
the way groups have been formed and on the relative status of these 
groups.”374  Commitment to the group was “enhanced when people have 
self-selected their group membership, or when the group [has] relatively 
high status.”375  According to Ellemers and colleagues, this result implies 
that people may display strong commitment to a group with low status if 
membership is self-selected or achieved, rather than imposed external-
ly.376 
Finally, Ellemers and colleagues argued that the three dimensions of 
social identity play different roles as mediators of group level behav-
iors.377  As predicted, the data showed that the group commitment aspect 
of social identity was the only predictor of ingroup favoritism.378 
Milne and Duckitt “investigated the dimensionality of organizational 
identification . . . and attitudinal commitment, their interrelationship, 
and their relationships with hypothesized causes and consequences.”379  
On the basis of previous empirical findings, Milne and Duckitt posited 
that organizational identification and commitment are concepts that 
overlap but are also separate and empirically distinguishable.380  Accord-
ingly, their research was designed to determine the specific dimensions 
that these concepts have in common and on which they may be dis-
tinct.381 
Results revealed six primary dimensions of organizational identifica-
tion and commitment: ingroup affect, commitment, ingroup ties, percep-
tion of oneness, centrality, and personalization.382  The commitment fac-
 
373. Id. at 385. 
374. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
375. Id. 
376. Id. 
377. Id. at 383. 
378. Id. at 384. 
379. Jessica Milne & John Duckitt, A Multidimensional Approach to Organizational 
Identification and Commitment, in PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH 
173, 173 (Bettina P. Reimann ed., 2008). 
380. Id. at 176–77. 
381. Id. at 178. 
382. Id. at 182. 
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tor is predominately related to the construct of organizational commit-
ment.383  The ingroup affect factor is a product of both organizational 
commitment and organizational identification.384  The remaining four 
factors—ingroup ties, centrality, personalization, and perception of one-
ness—are products of organizational identification.385  These findings 
support the assumption that the primary difference between organiza-
tional identification and commitment is that in organizational identifica-
tion individuals perceive “themselves in terms of their organizational 
membership, while in commitment they do not.”386 
In the context of hazing, ingroup-outgroup dynamics may leave fra-
ternity and sorority pledges feeling allied with each other and against 
big brothers and big sisters.  With such feelings may come a sense of be-
trayal for or against the pledge who abandons the pledge group even as 
the hazing becomes increasingly risky for the pledges. 
E. Need for Esteem 
Pyszczynski and colleagues provided an exhaustive theoretical and 
empirical review of research on why people need self-esteem and what 
psychological function it serves.387  Pyszczynski and colleagues found 
widespread empirical support for the assumption that self-esteem serves 
an anxiety-buffering function, thus supporting the tenets of Terror Man-
agement Theory (TMT) and its explanations of why people need self-
esteem.388  TMT posits, inter alia, that a person’s cultural worldview and 
self-esteem both serve as an anxiety-buffering function in the human 
predicament of existential terror.389  TMT defines self-esteem as a sense 
of personal value that is obtained by believing in one’s worldview and 
living up to the standards of value prescribed by one’s worldview.390  
TMT predicts that people try to defend their cultural worldview when 
they are threatened by mortality concerns, particularly if their self-





386. Id. at 193. 
387. Tom Pyszczynski et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Em-
pirical Review, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 435, 435, 438 (2004). 
388. Id. at 436, 438. 
389. Id. at 436–37. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. at 437. 
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of mortality (i.e., mortality salience hypothesis) to document the terror 
management function of self-esteem, such reminders need not be pre-
sent for people to pursue the protective functions of self-esteem.392 
Fuller and colleagues conducted an empirical analysis on why con-
strued external image is related to organizational identification.393  “Or-
ganizational identification is ‘a perceived oneness with an organization 
and the experience of the organization’s successes and failures as one’s 
own.’”394  “[O]rganizational identification occurs when an individual’s 
self-concept is tied to his or her organizational membership.”395  Several 
antecedents of organizational identification have been identified, one of 
which is construed external image.396  Construed external image, also 
known as perceived external prestige (PEP), “refers to a member’s be-
liefs about outsiders’ perceptions of the organization”397 and “summariz-
es a member’s beliefs about how people outside the organization are 
likely to view the member through his or her organizational affilia-
tion.”398 
Fuller and colleagues investigated the theoretical explanation of the 
positive relationship between construed external image and organiza-
tional identification and examined the extent to which the need for self-
esteem accounts for this relationship.399  Results confirmed the hypothe-
ses (1) that an organizational member’s construed external image would 
be positively related to the member’s organizational identification and 
(2) that this relationship would be moderated by the member’s need for 
self-esteem.400  Specifically, the data showed “no significant relationship 
between construed external image and organizational identification for 
individuals with low need for self-esteem,” whereas “for individuals with 
 
392. Id. at 437–39. 
393. J. Bryan Fuller et al., Construed External Image and Organizational Identification: 
A Test of the Moderating Influence of Need for Self-Esteem, 146 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 701 
(2006). 
394. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fred Mael & Blake E. Ashforth, Alumni and Their 
Alma Mater: A Partial Test of the Reformulated Model of Organizational Identification, 13 J. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 103, 103 (1992)). 
395. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 703 (citing Jane E. Dutton et al., Organizational Im-
ages and Member Identification, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 239, 239 (1994)). 
396. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 702. 
397. Id. at 702, 704 (quoting Dutton et al., supra note 395, at 248) (citing Ale Smidts et 
al., The Impact of Employee Communication and Perceived External Prestige on Organiza-
tional Identification, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1051, 1051 (2001)). 
398. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 704 (quoting Dutton et al., supra note 395, at 250). 
399. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 705. 
400. Id. at 708, 710. 
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a high need for self-esteem, the relationship [was] strongly positive.”401  
These results are consistent with Fuller and colleagues’ hypothesis that 
“outsiders’ opinion of the organization is likely to strongly influence” 
the self-concept of individuals with high need for self-esteem “because 
their feelings of self-worth are strongly dependent on the attention and 
positive evaluations of other people,” whereas individuals with a low 
need for self-esteem “are not strongly motivated by the need for others 
to view them positively.”402  Fuller and colleagues explained that their 
results “challenge the assumption in Social Identity Theory that all peo-
ple share a similar need for self-esteem” and will accordingly seek to es-
tablish the positive distinctiveness of their groups in order to meet their 
own needs for positive self-esteem.403 
F. Obedience to Authority 
In his 1963 study, Milgram found that sixty-five percent of partici-
pants were willing to obey authority and administer an electric shock to 
a co-participant (hereinafter the “learner”) who failed to learn word 
pairs,404 despite protests from the learner and indications that such 
shocks were dangerous.405  Milgram’s findings have gained widespread 
acceptance within academia, so much so that some researchers contend 
that Milgram’s findings can help explain the behaviors of others who 
commit atrocities.406  Darley “violently object[s],” claiming that there are 
important distinctions between the behaviors of subjects in the Milgram 
situation and those who commit atrocities, such as the “Nazi doctors, 
concentration camp executioners, or Serbian snipers who assassinate 
children.”407  He explains that, unlike the former, the latter commit such 
acts “without supervision of authorities, without external pressure, and 
they use their intelligence to independently determine how they will do 
 
401. Id. at 711–12. 
402. Id. at 706. 
403. Id. at 712–13. 
404. See Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now 
Know About Obedience to Authority, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 955, 969 (1999) (citing 
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 
373–74, 376 (1963)). 
405. See John M. Darley, Constructive and Destructive Obedience: A Taxonomy of Prin-
cipal-Agent Relationships, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES, no. 3, 1995 at 125, 125–26 (discussing the design 
of Milgram’s experiment); Milgram, supra note 404, at 373–74. 
406. Darley, supra note 405, at 126–27 (discussing the acceptance of Milgram’s findings 
and empirical research generalizing the results to other “agentic situations”). 
407. Id. at 133. 
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so.”408  He further contends that the participants in the Milgram situation 
who continued to administer shocks in accordance with the experiment-
er’s orders were not, phenomenologically, deciding to harm another 
person.409  Instead, they found themselves torn between two incompati-
ble perspectives as to the meaning of continuing with the experiment.410  
Critical to this analysis is the construction of the participant’s meaning 
of the experimenter’s behavior.  Darley posits a taxonomy of situations 
to categorize the behaviors of a person in authority, the principal, and 
those of a subordinate, the agent, who acts on that authority.411  Relying 
on the law of agency, Darley concludes that the responsibility for any 
harm done in the Milgram situation rests entirely with the experimenter 
as the principal.412 
Next, Darley conducted a Milgram-type study involving participants 
who believed they were in a setting in which they would have to punish 
someone, although no punishment actually took place.413  Participants 
were presented with information they believed the experimenter did not 
have and in this circumstance chose what Darley calls “constructive 
obedience,” in contrast to the destructive obedience of the Milgram 
studies.414  Participants modified their proposed behavior in light of this 
information while maintaining the overall aims of the experimenter.415  
According to Darley, this result suggests that Milgram’s data might be 
read as implying the same sort of process in those conditions where Mil-
gram left the room.416  That is, participants might have thought that Mil-
gram would have instructed them differently had he been able to hear 
the learner’s cries.417 
In 1974, Philip Zimbardo wrote a short article contending that Mil-
gram’s experiment provides powerful support for the idea that situa-
tional determinants, and not a person’s individual characteristics, de-
termine behavior.418  Commenting on Milgram’s research and his own 
 
408. Id. at 133–34. 
409. Id. at 133. 
410. Id. 
411. Id. at 135–36, 140 & tbl. 1. 
412. See id. at 135–36, 138. 
413. See id. at 142, 147. 
414. Id. at 141–42, 145–47, 150. 
415. Id. at 148. 
416. Id. at 151. 
417. Id. 
418. See Philip G. Zimbardo, On “Obedience to Authority,” 29 AM. PSYCHOL. 566, 566 
(1974). 
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companion research on prison behavior, Zimbardo noted the three ma-
jor research themes in each: 
 (a) [T]hat obedience to authority requires each of us to first 
participate in the myth-making process of creating authority fig-
ures who then must legitimize their authority through the evi-
dence of our submission and obedience to them; 
 (b) that the reason we can be manipulated so readily is pre-
cisely because we maintain an illusion of personal invulnerability 
and personal control, all the time being insensitive to the power 
of social forces and “discriminable” stimuli within the situation, 
which are in fact the potent determinants of action; and 
 (c) that evil deeds are rarely the product of evil people acting 
from evil motives, but are the product of good bureaucrats simp-
ly doing their job.419 
Zimbardo concluded that we must focus on acquiring more 
knowledge about the social conditions that cause us to behave in ways 
that contradict our morals and expectations and that we must “critically 
reexamine the ethics and tactics of our revered social institutions, which 
lay the foundation for our mindless obedience to rules, to expectations, 
and to people playing at being authorities.”420 
As mentioned above, Zimbardo concluded that it is important to fo-
cus on the situational determinants that lead to the uncritical acceptance 
of authority.421  Robert Lavine cautions, however, that the emphasis on 
situational determinants of obedience to authority should not obscure 
other factors that contribute to this phenomenon.422  Specifically, Lavine 
contends that cultural and personality differences may influence obedi-
ence to authority, with the caveat that “such traits probably change over 
time and generations, are subject to situational and historical variables, 
and interact with individual differences.”423  Despite the potential inter-
active effects, Lavine contends that future researchers should develop 
studies that take into account the potential impact of cultural factors on 





422. Robert A. Lavine, Personality Traits Across Cultures and Research on Obedience, 
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G. Organizational Prestige 
Carmeli’s study proposed and tested a model which links two forms 
of perceived organizational prestige with employee affective commit-
ment and organizational citizenship behaviors.425  Organizational pres-
tige refers to an “employee’s own beliefs about how other people out-
side the organization . . . evaluate the status and prestige of the 
organization.”426  Carmeli identified two forms of perceived organiza-
tional prestige: “[S]ocial prestige, covering (1) quality of management, 
(2) quality of products or services, (3) ability to attract, develop, and re-
tain talented people, (4) community and environmental responsibility, 
and (5) innovativeness; and economic prestige, covering (1) financial 
soundness, (2) long-term investment value, and (3) use of organization 
assets.”427 
Next, Carmeli examined organizational identification.  Organiza-
tional identification is the “‘perception of oneness with or belongingness 
to some human aggregat[ion].’  It occurs when one integrates beliefs 
about one’s organization into one’s identity.”428  Carmeli measured or-
ganizational identification in terms of affective commitment, which re-
fers to “positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and in-
volvement in, the work organization.”429 
Carmeli put forth three hypotheses: (1) “Both perceived external 
economic prestige and perceived external social prestige augment em-
ployees’ affective commitment to their organization, but perceived ex-
ternal social prestige will have a larger impact”; (2) “[p]erceived exter-
nal economic prestige and perceived external social prestige will have 
positive interactive effects on employees’ affective commitment to their 
organization”; and (3) the relationship between both forms of PEP and 
citizenship behaviors would be mediated by affective commitment.430 
 
425. Abraham Carmeli, Perceived External Prestige, Affective Commitment, and Citizen-
ship Behaviors, 26 ORG. STUD. 443, 443–44 (2005). 
426. Id. at 444. 
427. Id. at 446. 
428. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blake E. Ashforth & Fred 
Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 21 (1989)) (cit-
ing Michael G. Pratt, To Be or Not to Be? Central Questions in Organizational Identification, 
in IDENTITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: BUILDING THEORY THROUGH CONVERSATIONS 171, 172 
(David A. Whetten & Paul C. Godfrey eds., 1998)). 
429. Carmeli, supra note 425, at 446 (quoting John P. Meyer & Natalie J. Allen, Testing 
the “Side-Bet Theory” of Organizational Commitment: Some Methodological Considerations, 
69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 372, 375 (1984)). 
430. Carmeli, supra note 425, at 449–50. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 28 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 28 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  3:41 PM 
48 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
The results revealed that both forms of PEP affect employees’ affec-
tive commitment to their organization, though perceived external social 
prestige may have a larger effect, confirming the first hypothesis.431  
However, the findings failed to support the second hypothesis that both 
forms of PEP would produce a positive interactive effect on affective 
commitment.432  Carmeli noted that the data on the second hypothesis 
contradicts previous research and may be due to the nature of the set-
ting in which the sampled employees worked (social workers in health 
care institutions).433  Finally, “the mediating hypothesis was supported 
only for the relationship between perceived external social prestige and 
altruism.”434 
Carmeli explained that these results may suggest that organizations 
may be perceived as prestigious but not in all aspects of the definition.435  
Carmeli interpreted the results as providing support for the more gen-
eral hypothesis that when members believe that outsiders have positive 
perceptions of their organization, they identify more with the organiza-
tion, and this increased identification is translated into altruistic behav-
ior.436 
Carmeli and colleagues adopted a stakeholder approach to assess 
the impact of PEP on organizational members’ cognitive identification 
and affective commitment.437  Stakeholder theory holds that the organi-
zation should be analyzed from the perspective of the organization’s key 
interest constituents because they affect, and are affected by, the behav-
iors of the organization.438  Applying that theory to the study by Carmeli 
and colleagues involved an evaluation of whether an employee’s per-
sonal assessment of how outsiders view the organization fosters cogni-
tive identification and whether such identification ultimately influences 
an employee’s affective commitment.439 
Cognitive identification refers to the “perception that one shares[] 
 
431. Id. at 453, 454 tbl.1. 
432. Id. at 455, 459. 
433. Id. at 459–60. 
434. Id. at 456. 
435. Id. at 459. 
436. Id. at 460. 
437. Abraham Carmeli et al., Perceived External Prestige, Organizational Identification 
and Affective Commitment: A Stakeholder Approach, 9 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 92, 93 
(2006). 
438. See id. at 93. 
439. See id. at 92, 95, 101–02. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 29 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 29 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  3:41 PM 
2013] HAZING CONSENT 49 
the experiences, successes[,] and failures of the focal organization, and 
that these successes and failures apply to and reflect upon the self just as 
they reflect upon the organization.”440  Affective commitment refers to 
the “positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and involve-
ment in, the work organization.”441  Carmeli and colleagues examined 
two components of affective commitment: love and joy.442  The love 
component is concerned with the member’s “emotional attraction or af-
fection toward the organization as a social category,” while the joy com-
ponent refers to the happiness that arises from the organization as a so-
cial category.443 
Carmeli and colleagues hypothesized that “[PEP] among competi-
tors, customers and suppliers is positively related [to cognitive] organi-
zational identification,” and that “[c]ognitive organizational identifica-
tion mediates the relationship between [PEP] and affective 
commitment.”444  These hypotheses were tested on a sample of Israeli 
employees who work for four organizations in the electronics and media 
industries.445 
Results showed that high PEP (of competitors, customers, and sup-
pliers) causes employees to develop a higher level of cognitive organiza-
tional identification, confirming the first hypothesis.446  The data on the 
differences among the three groups of stakeholders was non-significant 
for the first hypothesis.447  The second hypothesis was also confirmed, 
but differential effects were observed among the three groups with re-
spect to the two forms of affective commitment.448  On the affective 
commitment-love measure, it was found that employees “who construe 
the prestige that the competitors and suppliers attribute to their organi-
zation as favorable” they report greater love for the organization as a 
social category.449  No significant effects were observed for customers on 
 
440. Id. at 94 (alteration in original) (quoting Fred A. Mael & Lois E. Tetrick, Identify-
ing Organizational Identification, 52 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 813, 816 (1992)). 
441. Carmeli et al., supra note 437, at 94 (quoting Meyer & Allen, supra note 429, at 
375). 
442. Carmeli et al., supra note 437, at 102. 
443. Id. 
444. Id. at 95. 
445. Id. 
446. Id. at 97, 98 tbl.2. 
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this measure.450  On the affective commitment-joy measure, it was found 
that when employees “construe the prestige that the competitors and 
customers attribute to their organization as favorable” report a greater 
sense of happiness arising from the organization as a social category.451  
No significant relation was observed for suppliers on this measure.452  
With respect to the claim about the meditating role of cognitive organi-
zational identification, the researchers found support for the assumption 
that cognitive organizational identification mediates “the relationship 
between both PEP (competitors) and PEP (suppliers) and affective 
commitment.”453 
On the whole, the data suggest that employees attribute consistent 
care and attention to all reference groups with respect to cognitive or-
ganizational identification, but that employees view some stakeholders 
as more critical to the organization than others with respect to the two 
forms of affective commitment.454 
Carmeli and Freund developed and tested a model that explores 
how perceived organizational prestige influences job satisfaction, affec-
tive commitment, and turnover intentions among Israeli social workers 
in the nonprofit sector.455  Results of two separate studies showed that 
high levels of perceived organizational prestige cause employees to de-
velop high levels of commitment and satisfaction456 and lower levels of 
intention to leave the organization.457  This finding is consistent with 
previous research (such as that discussed above) and further validates 
the relationship between organizational image and organizational at-
tachment.458 
H. Symbolic Interaction 
Symbolic interactionist theory is based in part on the assumption 





453. Id. at 101–02. 
454. Id. at 102–03. 
455. Abraham Carmeli & Anat Freund, Linking Perceived External Prestige and Inten-
tions to Leave the Organization: The Mediating Role of Job Satisfaction and Affective Com-
mitment, 35 J. SOC. SERVICE RES. 236, 237, 247 (2009). 
456. Id. at 242, 245, 247. 
457. Id. at 242–43, 245–46. 
458. Id. at 247. 
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people that individuals develop their sense of self and their understand-
ing of the world.459  Accordingly, how a person understands others, how 
others come to understand that person, and how a person comes to un-
derstand and identify himself or herself are part of the symbolic interac-
tion process.460  Charles Cooley explained this phenomenon in terms of a 
looking glass metaphor, in which we each undergo a similar process to 
develop a unique self.461  That is, the sense of self that we each develop is 
shaped by our interactions with people significant to us.462  What is dif-
ferent, however, is the group of people we each consider to be signifi-
cant.463  In the context of pledging, the identity of aspirants is influenced 
because members isolate aspirants from their other significant social 
groups, thereby causing aspirants to ascribe more significance to the fra-
ternity as the relevant reference group.464  The ultimate implication is 
that aspirants come to view the fraternity as the reference group from 
which they must gain social approval.465 
Another important assumption of symbolic interactionist theory 
concerns the role that perception and meaning play in an individual’s 
significant interactions.466  Symbolic interactionism rests on three prem-
ises.  The first is that individuals “act toward things on the basis of the 
meanings these things have for them.”467  The second premise is that the 
meaning of these things is derived from or arises out of the social inter-
action that one has with one’s social counterparts.468  The third premise 
is that these meanings are handled and modified through an interpretive 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he or she encoun-
ters.469 
Applying Blumer’s premises, Sweet contends that “hazing is not 
simply the result of psychologically or morally flawed individuals; but is 
 
459. Stephen Sweet, Understanding Fraternity Hazing: Insights from Symbolic Interac-
tionist Theory, 40 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 355, 358 (1999). 
460. See id. 
461. Id. at 359 (citing CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL 
ORDER (1970)). 
462. Sweet, supra note 459, at 359. 
463. See id. 
464. Id. at 359, 361–62 (discussing the theories of role taking and reference groups and 
applying those theories to hazing). 
465. Id. at 361. 
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the result of a confluence of symbols, manipulated identities, and defini-
tions of situations that are organized in the context of fraternity initia-
tion rites.”470  Sweet concludes that in order to understand why aspirants 
consent to hazing, one must first understand the subcultural factors that 
affect their perceptions of hazing situations.471  Such an understanding, 
Sweet suggests, will allow one to shape decisions about one’s conduct in 
the face of hazing situations.472 
Jones and Volpe examined organizational identification from the 
perspective of a symbolic interaction theory.473  Symbolic interaction 
theory emphasizes the importance of social relations in organizational 
identification.474  Thus, Jones and Volpe examined the influence of social 
networks on organizational identification processes.475  To do so, they 
examined the interactive effects of two categorical antecedents of organ-
izational identification—organizational distinctiveness and organiza-
tional prestige476—and the general antecedents of social networks (net-
work size, network density, and relationship strength).477 
Results showed that both organizational distinctiveness and “organi-
zationally affiliated network size positively influenced the strength of 
individuals’ organizational identification by promoting communication 
with others” as a way of strengthening commitment to and identification 
with the organization.478  Results further indicated that “relationship 
strength amplified the effect of organizational prestige on organizational 
identification,” but that “organizational prestige had no direct effect on 
organizational identification for this sample.”479  These results highlight 
 
470. Id. at 358, 362 (citing HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: 
PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD (1969)). 
471. See Sweet, supra 459, at 363. 
472. Id. 
473. See Candace Jones & Elizabeth Hamilton Volpe, Organizational Identification: Ex-
tending Our Understanding of Social Identities Through Social Networks, 32 J. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 413, 413–14 (2011). 
474. Id. at 413.  Symbolic interaction theory can be contrasted with social identity theo-
ry, which focuses on the categorization and comparison processes that inform an individual’s 
perception of the organization and ultimately stimulate identification with the organization.  
See id. at 414. 
475. Id. 
476. Id. at 415–16. 
477. Id. at 416–17. 
478. Id. at 425 (citing Michael Humphreys & Andrew D. Brown, Narratives of Organiza-
tional Identity and Identification: A Case Study of Hegemony and Resistance, 23 ORG. STUD. 
421, 439 (2002)). 
479. Id. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 31 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 31 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  3:41 PM 
2013] HAZING CONSENT 53 
the type and structure of specific relationships that influence an individ-
ual’s organizational identification and ultimately suggest that introduc-
ing a social network perspective allows researchers to “better under-
stand and predict organizational identification.”480 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“It would seem that the old saw about what happens when you ‘as-
sume’ proves again to be quite accurate.”481  The existence of consent or 
lack thereof, whether we think about it from the statutory or common 
law approach, appears to be imbued with a bit of armchair theorizing.  
There seems to be an assumption that hazing “victims” either can or 
cannot consent to their ordeal without truly reconciling that assessment 
with what social science—the study of human behavior—might have to 
say.  In Yost, the court assumed that the plaintiff was not coerced.482  In 
Quinn, the court found the opposite, suggesting that the social pressure 
that exists within Greek-letter organization pledging culture to comply 
with initiation procedures is nearly insurmountable.483  In Nisbet, the 
court noted that while the decedent could have walked away, the social 
pressure to join blinded him to the dangers he faced.484  Each of these 
cases, and the other examples of fraternity hazing may have come to the 
right conclusion.  They, however, appear to leap over what a deeper un-
derstanding of the social science might say about hazing consent. 
A fraternity or sorority pledge may begin a pledge process, and once 
they start down the path of being hazed, not realize the stakes associat-
ed with the activity.  These pledges may believe that there are not ade-
quate opportunities to quit and may not know enough about the organi-
zation or the pledge experience to properly evaluate the consequences 
of persisting or quitting.  As such, pledges may perceive that if they stick 
it out for another day and another day and yet another day, they will fi-
nally be members.  But, often, those days may turn into weeks or 
months of hazing.  Such thinking may be particularly pronounced in 
groups, like pledge classes, where the individual’s identity is submerged 
for the sake of the group’s identity and where group members are 
 
480. Id. 
481. Swift v. Seidler (In re Swift), 198 B.R. 927, 939 n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). 
482. Yost v. Wabash Coll., 976 N.E.2d 724, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
483. Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 507 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
484. Nisbet v. Bucher, 949 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
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stressed and hampered in their ability to critically evaluate the situation 
in which they find themselves.  Even more, the hostile environment that 
big brothers or sisters may create for a pledge class may forge a bond 
between those pledges as a cohesive group in contrast to the big broth-
ers or sisters.  Such a bond may be difficult for pledge class members to 
terminate even for their own self-preservation.  And in these contexts 
where big brothers or sisters exert their authority, pledges may willingly 
submit to that authority even if being hazed.  Where the fraternity or so-
rority is of high prestige, either on the pledge’s respective campus or in 
society more widely, the pledge may be driven to tolerate being hazed to 
be a part of such an organization in and of itself but also as a means to 
enhance his or her own self-esteem.  In the end, the pledges may come 
to gain a deeper understanding of themselves during the pledge process 
and be unwilling to relinquish that understanding. 
While all of this may be true, it is still not universal.  For example, a 
fraternity pledge may come from a long-line of fraternity men or have 
had a mentor who was a fraternity man.  The pledge may have heard 
“war stories” about what it was like to be on-line.  Before seeking fra-
ternity membership, the pledge may have done his homework on frater-
nity-life and been apprised of what hazing is like.  The fraternity may 
have provided a deep and meaningful education to the pledge on the 
dangers of hazing—informing him of hazing injuries and deaths with 
some specificity.  A pledge may not “buy into” the notion of submerging 
the “I” for the sake of the “we.”  As such, a pledge may not be interest-
ed in the goal of the group—completing the pledge process—vis-à-vis 
the pledge’s own interest of self-preservation.  A pledge may not readily 
submit to authority or only do so when he perceives the hazing to be 
mild.  A pledge may be interested in joining a fraternity but not perceive 
the organization as being particularly prestigious, and thus his esteem 
may not be enhanced by membership.  Even more, pledges may feel as 
though they gain little insight into who they are as a result of the pledge 
process.  Courts and legislatures should be mindful of these and other 
factors and evaluate hazing consent on a case-by-case basis. 
